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Preface 
'The thesis of this dissertation is that there is no such thing as a 
computer system. Or to be more specific, we are unable to agree with 
the concept of "a computer system" as being something monolithic that 
can be represented by a single conceptual model, which is internally 
and externally consistent, and which behaves as a whole in a uniform 
and predictable way, under all foreseen circumstances. 
There may be little initial disagreement with a statement such as this 
put in this way, yet we find in practice that it is just such a view which 
is usually applied. The assumption that a system is a single entity 
about which global statements can be made (such as "the system is 
secure" or " the system works") is unfortunately all too common. 
Many aspects of computer systems such as availability, reliability, 
functionality (sometimes too much as well as too little) and ease of use 
are the subject of criticism by both users and operators; and also by 
many sections of the public, who although not necessarily users of the 
systems directly, can be seriously affected by their operation. 
This dissertation examines limitations of design in some current 
distributed computer systems, and proposes approaches that can help 
us that better reflect the true needs of all participants, including 
operators, users and other affected parties. In particular, we have 
looked at ways in which the design of systems could be improved by a 
systematic approach to the identification and reconciliation of the 
many different assumptions that are held by the separate parties with 
a stake in the system. 
We observe that the goals, objectives, concepts and assumptions of the 
various parties involved in the system (such as designers, 
programmers, operators and users) seldom, if ever, seem to coincide. 
Work in the areas of Software Engineering1 and Requirements 
Analysis2 has attempted to address the problem of the unambiguous 
1 Software Engineering is a term that was introduced in the late 1960's in an attempt to focus attention on the 
inadequacies of software development at that time. It was an attempt to suggest ways of bringing engineering styk 
disciplines to the software development process. A recent overview of methods and techniques can be found in [RT96]. 
2 Requirements Analysis is a term that is applied to the process of establishing and documenting the user and fanctional 
needs of a system. A KtJOd introduction to Software Requirements Analysis can be found in [D90] and [S90]. 
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specification of software systems requirements. Several books on 
Software Engineering cover the topic briefly (see, for example, [GM86], 
[JT79], [P87], [S89]), and [IEEE85] provides a good overview of 
Software Requirements Engineering work in the US; but there are 
relatively few publications that are exclusively concerned with 
requirements specification in general. It appears to be a common 
characteristic of the techniques we have come across that they assume 
a centralised approach; with the system (and, in general, only the 
software component) being developed by a team with shared 
understanding and a common specification. 
We believe that there is a need for a more detailed characterisation of 
the various participants in a computer system, and of their roles and 
underlying assumptions. This would lead to better identification and 
understanding of those areas where the assumptions are at odds with 
one other, rely on undefined capabilities or or are open to being 
understood (and therefore implemented) in more than one way. 
We have sought a methodology that will allow us to better identify 
those areas of possible conflict or lack of knowledge, and we have 
looked for ways to improve the systems engineering approach to the 
design of computer-based systems in a practical manner that can be 
readily understood and easily applied. 
We propose that systems are examined in a manner that analyses the 
conditions under which they have been designed to perform, examines 
the . circumstances under which it has been implemented, and 
compares the two. We believe that such an approach is essential since 
in our experience we have (sadly) seldom found the two situatio:µs to be 
the same. Unfortunately, we find the application of designs for one 
context being applied inappropriately to another. 
We are proposing that anyone planning to design a system, or part of 
one, should look at it from the point of view of each of the participants. 
This should encompass all of the components - including users3 and 
implementers - to see what is being relying on by the various parties 
and to r esolve differences in assumptions and approach4 • 
3 For exampks of approaches to the probkms involving the difficulties of accommodating human operators when 
designin!( interactive systems see [WA91]. 
4 We have come across an approach that seeks to codify this ([M79], [L85]), though it appears to be poorly documented. 
Other conceptual modelling techniques are more commonly found; su, for exampk, [A77]. [BGM85}, [DM88}, 
[SR77], [YC79]. Though we should not forget that non-functional requirements tend to be so varied and compkx that 
natural lany;ua?! must be used for their expression. 
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We begin our analysis by looking at what is being trusted in a system, 
or for what a system is being trusted, and by what or whom. We 
examine some approaches developed in a (military) security context 
and in widespread use in commercial distributed systems. We 
demonstrate how the inappropriate application of these concepts can 
lead to unanticipated risks to the system and its users. 
We show how the usual use of trust as a system property5 can restrict 
our ability to reason about the security properties of a system. We 
introduce a new concept of trust that we show to be more useful for the 
analysis of the risk characteristics of a system. In particular, we show 
how our approach can be extended to the analysis of sub-systems and 
even to individual systems components. 
We propose that trust be considered as a "relative" concept rather than 
the more usual usage as a system property; and that trust is a 
substitute for knowledge rather than the result of it. We show that 
although the concepts originate in a security domain, they are equally 
applicable to the analysis of risk throughout a commercial system, its 
components and its users. 
References 
[A77] M.W. Alford. A requirements engineering methodology for 
real time processing requirements. IEEE Transactions on 
Software Engineering, Vol. SE-3, No. 1, 1977, pp. 60-69. 
[BGM85] A. Borgida, S. Greenspan and J. Mylopoulos. Knowledge 
representation as a basis for requirements specification. 
IEEE Computer, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1985, pp. 82-101. 
[D90] 
[DM88] 
A.M.Davis. Software Requirements, Analysis and 
Specification. Prentice-Hall 1990. 
T. DeMarco. Structured Analysis and System 
Specification. Yourdon Press, New York 1988. 
[IEEE85] IEEE Computer, Vol. 18, No. 4, April 1985. 
[GM86] Narain Gehani and Andrew McGettrick (eds.). Software 
Specification Techniques. Addison-Wesley 1986. 
Many approaches to requirements analysis adopt the principk: "It should only specify external system behaviour [HBO]. 
Ill 
[H80] 
[JT79] 
[L85] 
[M79] 
[P87] 
[RT96] 
[S89] 
[S90] 
[SR77] 
[WA91] 
[YC79] 
K.L.Heninger. Specifying software requirements for 
complex systems. New techniques and their 
applications. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 
Vol. SE-6, No. 1, 1980, pp. 2-13. 
Randall W. Jensen and Charles C. Tonies. Software 
Engineering. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 1979. 
M. Looney. CORE - A Debrief Report. NCC Publications, 
Manchester 1985. 
G. Mullery. CORE - a method for controlled requirements 
specification. Proceedings of the 4th. International, 
Conference on Software Engineering, Munich 1979. 
Roger S. Pressman. Software Engineering, A Practitioner's 
Approach. McGraw-Hill 1987. 
C.V. Ramamoorthy and Wei-tek Tsai. Advances in 
Software Engineering. IEEE Computer, Vol. 29, No. 10, 
October 1996, pp.4 7-58. 
Ian Sommerville. Software Engineering, Third Edition. 
Addison-Wesley 1989. 
D.A.Stokes. Requirements Analysis. J.A. McDermid (ed), 
Software Engineer's Reference Book. 
Butterworth-Heinemann 1990. 
K. Schoman and D. T. Ross. Structured analysis for 
requirements definition. IEEE Transactions on Software 
_Engineering, Vol. SE-3, No. 1, 1977, pp. 6-15. 
George R.S. Weir and James L. Alty. Human-Computer 
Interaction and Complex Systems. Academic Press, 
London 1991. 
Edward Y ourdon and Larry L. Constantine: Structured 
Design: Fundamentals of a Discipline of Computer 
Program and Systems Design. Yourdon Press, Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ. 1979. 
iv 
"It is much easier to get forgiveness than to get permission " - (Attribution unknown). 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank all those who have helped and encouraged me to 
.complete this dissertation under what turned out to be far from ideal 
circumstances. 
My first thanks must go to Dr. Peter Wilby and David Talbot for their 
fulsome support of my initial application to Cambridge. Next, and by 
no means second, is Professor Roger Needham who was prepared to 
accept my application and also to become my supervisor. It was his 
encouragement that led me to investigate the ( then) new area of trust 
and delegation in distributed systems. 
I consider myself to be both lucky and privileged to have been at the 
Computer Laboratory at the same time as Rafi Y ahalom, Li Gong and 
Mark Lomas; friends and colleagues. My thanks to them for the many 
enjoyable and inspiring times; especially those at The Anchor, The 
Clarendon Arms, The Eagle and occasionally the Cork and Bottle. 
Throughout my time at the Computer Lab. Dr. Jean Bacon. has shown 
consistent interest in and support of my research; Jean, my many 
thanks. My thanks also to Professor David Wheeler for his insight, 
wit, and inability to let anyone get away with a sloppy thought. 
My deep gratitude goes to Professor Bruce Christianson of the 
University of Hertfordshire; for hosting me there, and for taking the 
time and effort to visit me to discuss my research. His continuing 
interest, and efforts, in support of my work to finish this thesis have 
been truly inestimable. 
Without the patience, perseverance, support and understanding of 
Roger Needham, this thesis would never have been completed and 
submitted. Roger, my sincerest thanks. 
My research has not been supported by any external body; and has 
therefore, in reality, been supported by my family. · My very deep 
appreciation goes to my daughters, Jennifer and Catriona, for their 
long-suffering patience and sacrifice over the years, and for their 
continuing encouragement. Above all, for their confidence in me and 
their undemanding love and support. 
V 
Contents 
Preface 
Acknowledgements 
Summary 
1. Introduction 
2. Security in Systems Design 
3. A Trusted Message Server 
4. Analysis of Some Security Protocols 
5. Trust and Computer Systems 
6. · Distributed Systems, Shared Data and Delegation 
7. Conclusions 
Appendix I 
Glossary 
Bibliography 
1 
V 
vu 
1 
14 
20 
29 
40 
60 
76 
94 
96 
100 
vi 
"Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" - Decimus Junius juvena/is. Satires, vi. 347 
Summary 
-We need to be able to reason about large systems, and not just about 
their components. For this we would like to have conceptual tools that 
will help us to understand the behaviour of these systems, and to help 
us make sense of other, possibly conflicting, views. 
In this dissertation we have sought to indicate the need for a new 
methodology that will allow us to better identify and understand those 
areas of possible conflict or lack of knowledge, and we have looked for 
ways to improve the design of computer-based systems in a practical 
manner that can be readily understood and applied. 
In particular, we have taken the concept of trust and how this can help 
us understand some of the basic security aspects of a system. We have 
paid particular attention to the nature and type of assumptions that 
are made both within and between computer systems when they seek 
to communicate with each other. 
The work contained in this dissertation has been motivated by a belief 
that the design and implementation of many computer-based systems 
in operation today do not meet the needs of users and operators; and 
by a strong desire to identify ways in which the design and engineering 
of such systems can be improved. 
We note that many assumptions are frequently made on a de facto 
basis and which are frequently not acknowledged or even recognised 
for what they are. We show that an incomplete understanding of what 
is being assumed, relied upon and trusted can lead to an inadequate 
understanding of true vulnerabilities of systems. We examine various 
trust aspects of systems and introduce a definition of trust that we 
believe can help towards a greater understanding of system 
weaknesses. 
We propose that systems are examined in a manner that analyses the 
conditions under which it has been designed to perform, examines the 
circumstances under which it has been implemented, and then 
compares the two. We believe such an approach to be essential since 
we have (sadly) seldom found in our experience the two situations to be 
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-the same. It is unfortunately all too common to find the application of 
a design for one context being inappropriately implemented in another. 
We are proposing that anyone planning the design of a system or part 
of a system should look at it from the point of view of each of the 
_participants, and that this should include all of the components -
including users and implementers ,;, to see what they are relying on and 
to make sure that these assumptions are compatible. 
We look at this problem from the approach of what is being trusted in 
a system, or what a system is being trusted for. We start from some 
approaches developed in a (military) security context and in 
widespread use in commercial distributed systems, and demonstrate 
how the inappropriate application of this concept can lead to 
unanticipated risks to the system. 
We show how the usual use of trust as a system property can restrict 
the ability to reason about the security properties of a system; and we 
introduce a new notion of trust that we show is more fruitful for the 
analysis of the risk characteristics of systems. In particular, we show 
how, in contrast, our approach can be applied to the analysis of sub-
systems and systems components. 
We propose that trust be considered a "relative" concept, in contrast to 
the more usual usage, and that it is not the result of knowledge but a 
substitute for it. We show that although the concepts arose in a 
security domain, they are equally applicable to the analysis of 
assumption and risk throughout a system and its components. 
In contrast to the standard use of trust as a property of a system, our 
notion of trust applies only within the context of a specific viewpoint 
from which to judge risks. We argue that it is only after the 
introduction of a specific context from which trust is to be judged, that 
we can understand many of the intrinsic vulnerabilities of a 
distributed system. 
We have introduced the concept of there being more than one 
viewpoint from which to describe the behaviour of a system, and 
therefore the trust relationships that pertain. The utility of this 
concept lies in its ability to enable the nature of the risks associated 
with a specific participant to be measured, whether these are explicitly 
recognised and accepted by them, or not. 
viii 
We propose a distinction between trust and trustworthy, and 
demonstrate that most current uses of the term trust are more 
appropriately to be viewed as statements of trustworthiness. 
In particular we propose that trust is more properly understood and 
used as a substitute for knowledge; rather than the traditional "Orange 
Book" [DOD85] concept of it being the result of knowledge; where 
something is trusted if it exists within the security boundary of the 
system, and can violate the security policy of the system. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Security in computer-based systems covers a number of diverse topics 
ranging from the physical protection of computers, peripherals, media 
and associated support services; to the design of specialised operating 
systems, communications systems, protocols and data encryption 
algorithms. 
The discussion of security of information systems is slightly more 
restricted typically covering protection of availability, integrity and 
confidentiality of information systems and their associated data. This 
includes, for example: 
- Access ( or denial thereoO to the computer system, programmes 
or data; 
- Modification to or running of programmes; 
- Control and sequencing of programmes and data; 
- Data and programme correctness; 
- Audit trails and transaction logs. 
These topics are often considered together because of their reliance on 
common mechanisms for their implementations within many computer 
systems. 
While computers and their associated peripherals were confined to the 
computer room, issues of security were relatively straightforward and 
consisted primarily of physical checks and barriers. These could still 
be somewhat sophisticated and complex in some specialised areas; 
such as military, governmental, nuclear and other hazardous 
environments; but once systems and their controls moved outside a 
common physical area, with significant elements being distributed, the 
complexity of ensuring the security of the system as a whole increased 
in a major way. 
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The connection of computers to communications networks heralded a 
new era in information technology. However the advent of distributed 
computing created a host of new problems for those concerned with 
ensuring and assuring the correct operation of these systems. 
-Major conflicts of objectives now began to occur as the goal of making 
computers and their facilities more accessible to users started to 
conflict with requirements for the integrity of the systems and their 
data, and for combating unauthorised access. 
Some consider that the implementation of sophisticated access control 
systems would provide for sufficient security in a system ( c.f. "Orange 
Book" [DOD85]); and concentration on access control mechanisms can 
be seen in much of the literature. 
Within military systems, the concept of "trust" is primarily associated 
with access to information and the associated controls for achieving 
this, and much work has been done on the design of "trusted" systems 
and components which implement these concepts. 
In the "Orange Book", the concept of trust is treated essentially as 
being an attribute of a system. It is implicit in its usage that there is 
just one viewpoint from which trust, and the security of a system, is to 
be judged. We believe this usage to have limited utility when applied 
to commercial open distributed systems: and this is also possibly the 
case in some military applications. 
In contrast to the use of trust as being a property of a system, we 
propose the notion that the concept of trust is best applied only-within 
the context of the specific viewpoints from which risks are being 
evaluated. _ We argue that it is only after the introduction of such 
specific contexts from which to judge trust, that we can appreciate 
many of the intrinsic vulnerabilities of distributed systems. 
A considerable amount of recent research has been devoted to the topic 
of cryptographic protocols, with particular emphasis being placed on 
public key cryptosystems. The concept of the public key cryptosystem 
was introduced in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman [DH76]. 
A public key cryptosystem uses two keys (a key pair) - one key for 
encryption and the other (different) one for decryption. Each key of the 
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pair act as a cryptographic inverse of the other, and knowledge of one 
will not of itself enable determination of the other . 
Such a focus is very understandable since it was the introduction of 
public key cryptography that for the first time made it possible to 
communicate securely over a non-secure channel without the need to 
use previously agreed keys. This was because it was no longer 
necessary to resort to the approach of having to communicate a secret 
key over an insecure communication channel, or by some other means 
of distribution, with the resulting risks involved. 
Public key systems frequently rely on third party elements for the 
secure delivery and verification of important information concerning 
participants, for example, their identities and public keys. This will 
often be in addition to the use of these third parties in their primary 
roles as active components of the system that are providing services 
and facilities such as routing and message delivery. 
Consideration of the security role of these third parties indicates that 
the military use of the concept of trust is not strictly appropriate to 
their activities. They are rightly referred to as "trusted third parties", 
but the nature of the trust involved is not easily captured using the 
"Orange Book" model. 
Using the concept of "trust" we introduce in this dissertation, it 
becomes clear that they are trusted by many different parties and for 
many different things. It also becomes apparent that not all users of 
these services will understand just what it is they are trusting these 
third-parties for. This is especially likely to be the case when users are 
not aware that these third-parties are also undertaking other active 
roles within the system; roles that might sometimes be incompatible 
with the nature of the trust being placed in them. 
Whatever we might feel about the effectiveness and security of current 
computer systems, public or private, it is becoming more difficult to 
avoid contact with them in our daily lives. For large number s of people 
it would be difficult to lead a normal life without resort to these 
systems, encompassing as they do, local networks, Internet, WWW, 
electronic mail services, specialised private networks and databases, 
medical systems and cash dispensers, for example. 
1 For more detailed coverage of cryptographic techniques the reader is referred to [KBJ], {P89], [W90], [S96]. 
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As computer-based systems become increasingly more widespread and 
pervasive, larger numbers of people are finding that they have a 
specific need or requirement to use them, or have great difficulty in 
avoiding them, if they are to go about their daily lives with a minimum 
of hassle and disruption. 
Many systems which appear to have remained unaltered over many 
years, have probably been updated and are now relying on computer-
based third-parties, unbeknown to the user; and sometimes also to the 
operator of the system. 
It is, however, an inescapable consequence of the way distributed 
computer systems are implemented, that the easier and greater the 
access to them becomes, the more their vulnerability increases. 
Some consider that we are moving towards an age of "information 
terrorists and information assassins',i ; where disruption to commerce 
is an easier and more effective way of targeting advanced industrial 
nations, than the more traditional and violent methods previously 
used. The target now becomes the information and associated 
communications systems that underpin modem industrial societies; 
the age of "information warfare" has already probably begun. 
People and organisations are probably able to survive the destruction 
of most if not all of their physical assets and possessions, which can be 
repaired or replaced in most instances; and where this is not the case, 
substitutes can usually be found. 
However, the irretrievable loss or corruption of data can prove to be a 
situation from which there is no practical means of recovery, with a 
resultant di,sastrous outcome. For many systems, stored information 
and data represent a form of active and living memory, the damage 
and loss of which can never be fully compensated for. 
The increasing pervasiveness, even intrusion, of computer-based 
systems into the daily lives and activities of the population at large has 
meant that many more people have become aware of the reliance that 
organisations place on these systems. Many systems fail to live up to 
the claims made for them of making life easier for those using them, 
often the opposite being the case; and frequently neither the systems, 
2 P. Strassman, fomzer head of IT at the US Department of Defame, speaking at the Fifth World Congress of ED/ Users. 
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nor those who run them, appear to be accountable to those who are 
required to use them. 
When computer-based systems go wrong in some way, especially when 
this is as a result of human error, the failures are often initially 
denied. This can be the result of the operator of the system not 
.recognising the particular failure mode, and therefore being more 
likely to blame the ("untrusted") user rather than the ("trusted") 
system for any ensuing problems. 
Examples of such problems abound, with reports of incorrect bills 
(sometimes ludicrously so), invoices for goods not ordered, "phantom" 
withdrawals from bank cash dispensers, and so on. Users can 
encounter great difficulties in trying to prove their case in the face of 
denials from the system operator and computer "experts", particularly 
when this is accompanied by a lack of knowledge of the workings of the 
system and with no access to it. 
In addition to the computer-based systems that are encountered on a 
daily basis in dealings with industry and commerce, there are also 
large numbers of other computer systems that can have a major impact 
on our lives and on society as a whole, and which can have far reaching 
social consequences. 
The growing use of information technology in both central and local 
government and their agencies has resulted in large amounts of 
computer-based data being accumulated on the population at large. 
Increasingly, these originally separate systems are being 
interconnected, with the result that many aspects of our lives can be 
affected by the use of computer-based systems in ways that are not 
always clearly understood. 
Nor is this situation restricted to government and official computer 
systems. There are also many computer-based systems in the private 
domain that hold data on large sections of the population. The 
existence of many of these systems is not generally publicised. 
These private systems also can have major effects ori the populace, 
containing as they do data on most aspects of our interactions with the 
business world: mailing lists, telephone directories, purchasing 
preferences and history, credit details and so on. This data, which in 
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many instances is inaccurate as well as incomplete is increasingly 
being sold and traded on a commercial basis. 
The numerous possibilities of things going wrong in interconnected 
systems that have been individually (and usually independently) 
designed - and in ways that cannot always be anticipated, let alone 
recognised - leads us to ask what is being trusted, how it is being 
trusted, and by whom. 
Gladstone said that it was Parliament's great duty to hold to account 
those who run the country. This leads us to ask the question of who is 
ultimately responsible for the actions of the computer systems we must 
use, and to whom those responsible are accountable. 
We see that many of today's computer-based systems are characterised 
by tension, and sometimes even conflict, between the users and the 
operators of the systems. This is frequently the result of differing 
expectations of what the systems should do, and how they should 
behave. 
At even a simple level we can see examples of systems operators who 
do not trust their users, and conversely, users who do not trust the 
computer systems they are often compelled to use. 
We believe that considerations such as these indicate that it is not 
adequate to consider there to be only one viewpoint from which the 
acceptability of a computer system is to be judged. Different 
participants in a system have different "stakes" in it and its correct 
operation, and therefore have different things at risk. 
We therefore believe that there is benefit to be gained from first 
considering-from which viewpoint a system is being judged, before 
evaluating whether the behaviour of the system is acceptable or not. 
It could be argued that all viewpoints are essentially the same and will 
therefore result in broadly similar results. However, if we consider 
that there are at least three main groups with a direct interest in the 
working of the system: operators, users, and designers: then even in 
the case where all groups belong to the same organisation, it is 
probable that their respective starting points and assumptions will 
differ in some significant ways from those of the others. 
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We maintain that this implies that they each view the risks associated 
with the system in a different way, and that in turn this means that 
they each must be trusting the system for different things. We note 
that this is not the conventional way of treating trust in relationship to 
computer systems. 
1.2 Aims of this research 
Against the background above, this dissertation sets out to examine 
assumptions underlying the design, operation and use of computer-
based systems, and in particular distributed systems, where reliability 
and integrity considerations are an essential part of their use and 
operation. 
It is clear to us that once systems and their controls are moved outside 
of a common, physically secure area, with large parts of the system 
being (possibly geographically) distributed, then the issues 
surrounding the integrity of the system and its operation are 
magnified and changed in possibly unpredictable ways. 
We look at issues involving systems design, security protocols and 
trust3 and ask how we can specify the properties and behaviour of the 
system in such a way that all parties involved can be satisfied with its 
operation; and we should perhaps note that they may all be satisfied 
for different reasons. 
We shall introduce a new notion of trust as it is applied to computer-
based systems and show how its use can enable us to analyse a 
computer-based system from a number of different perspectives. We 
show how our approach can be used to identify and measure the risks 
associated with the system for any particular participant. 
We examine issues such as: 
''What do we typically take on trust in current systems?" 
"How can we specify the security properties of a system so as to 
minimise the need for trust?" 
"Is it possible to do without trust altogether?" 
"To what extent can we make trust explicit rather than implicit?" 
3 The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines trust as "Finn belief in reliability, honesty, veracity, justice, strength, etc. of 
person or thinx~ 
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We look at what is trusted, by whom, and to what extent. We note that 
behaviour consistent with our notion of trust, (though not necessarily 
with that used as the basis of the "Orange Book"), is to be frequently 
observed in many users and operators in regard to their dealings with 
their computer systems. 
We question whether people are always aware of the nature and exact 
amount of trust that they actually place in the systems they use. In 
such deliberations it is perhaps worth noting that some estimates4 are 
that as much as 85% of computer crime is committed by insiders with 
validated access privileges. 
With this as a consideration we would propose that any analysis of risk 
and trust in relation to the operation of a computer-based system 
should also include as necessary constituent parts, those people 
involved in the operation of that system, in addition to more traditional 
components such as servers and programmes. 
In addition, we believe that in consideration of the nature of some 
insider attacks, the inclusion of the designers and implementers as 
constituent parts of the system should also be considered in any such 
analysis. 
We wish to investigate the implications of trust as applied in the 
context of computer-based systems, their constituent parts, and the 
environments in which they operate; and use this as a way of 
determining critical assumptions and vulnerabilities. 
The classical "Orange Book" approach to security of computer-based 
systems views the system as one that can be contained within a single 
boundary, ~th an "inside" and an "outside", and associates "trust" 
with being inside or outside this "secure" boundary. 
We would not disagree with the concept of a boundary defining the 
extent of a computer-based system. However, if a system is sometimes 
taken to include those people involved in operating it, and sometimes 
even those involved in the design and implementation of the system, 
then we would argue that there is not necessarily a single and unique 
boundary of a system under all considerations. A system will have a 
different "inside" and "outside" for different principals and viewpoints. 
4 P. Strassman, former head of IT at the US Department of Defense, speakinK at the Fifth World ConK7ess of ED! Users. 
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We show how the introduction of the concept of "viewpoints" can be 
used to distinguish the different risks that different participants have 
with respect to the system. 
We look at the terminology that is used to describe various 
formulations of the concepts of "trust" and "belief', and consider what 
useful distinctions can be made in these and many other of the terms 
that are commonly used in the specification and analysis of the 
security properties of computer-based systems. 
1.3 Scope of this work 
The initial motivation for this research came from a desire to examine 
what is meant by trusting a computer · system to run correctly a 
particular piece of software (a payroll programme, for example); and 
the implications of such trust being misplaced. 
We can be more specific and ask how we can assure ourselves that a 
given piece of software operating with known characteristics and 
behaviour running in a known environment over which we have direct 
control, will run identically in a similar system, over which we have no 
direct control. 
For the purposes of this discussion we could consider a very simple 
programme such as one that on being presented with an integer value 
between specified limits would return the value of rt to the number of 
significant digits specified. For such software, the correctness of the 
basic programme within its given environment would be known for a 
wide range of input values, even if it were not possible for the 
programme to be proved to be formally correct. 
We wish to ask how we can trust software to behave in the same 
(known) manner as in our original system, and in no other way, in a 
system over which we have no control, access to or directly verifiable 
knowledge. We look at the value to us of trust as a concept, and how a 
proposed new usage can help us in our understanding of the behaviour 
of computer systems. 
We examine the nature of trust and its relationship to other commonly 
used terms such as belief, reliance and delegation. We note in passing 
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that it is not the purpose of this dissertation to examine how to 
determine the correctness of a programme in the first instance. 
We have sought to analyse why the actual ways in which systems 
behave differ from users' expectations: i.e. why users are surprised 
when and how the system they are using fails for other than a 
straightforward hardware breakdown; and have examined the role 
that trust plays in users' expectations. 
In contrast to the common approach of "trust only what you can verify 
firsthand", we shall argue that it is preferable to consider trust to be a 
substitute for knowledge, and indicate how the concept of risk can be 
used to quantify the individual consequences of misplaced trust. 
The initial vehicle we use to examine these ideas is that of a Trusted 
Message Service. We look at a very simple model of how a trusted 
message server might operate. We consider initially the simple case of 
a server with only one message to deliver, and with that message to be 
delivered to only one principal. 
We examine what is involved in determining that the message delivery 
was successful, and we show that some assumptions and observations 
require additional, and sometimes conflicting, actions to be taken, if 
the security of the system as a whole is to be considered. We show that 
these additional actions lie outside the original basic design of the 
message server mechanism. 
We subsequently apply the insights gained from this analysis to some 
specific areas, and identify previously unconsidered vulnerabilities, 
and identify the dangers of "hidden" delegation. 
1.4 Basic considerations 
Some feel that sophisticated access control mechanisms will suffice to 
ensure the integrity and security of a system, indeed a key concept of 
trusted systems standards is to control rather than facilitate access to 
the system [KE93]. However, as we have already noted, it is estimated 
that up to 85% of computer crime is committed by insiders with valid 
access. 
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This suggests that a concentration on access control will not of itself be 
sufficient to avoid incurring significant risks to the integrity of a 
computer system; though it is, of course, a necessary component. 
There is growing awareness that no computer system is fault free, and 
increasing attention has being paid to identifying the risks associated 
with such systems, and to methods of confining and controlling them. 
The approach is often that it is now known that what has been 
implemented does not behave correctly under certain circumstances -
representing a risk to the operation of the system; and that it is 
possible to retrospectively supplement or modify the design, in order to 
minimise or control the newly identified risks. 
Many assumptions underlying the design of a computer system are 
often made on a de facto basis and are not always acknowledged, or 
even r ecognised, for what they are. We show how an incomplete 
assessment of all the assumptions that are actually being made can 
lead to an inadequate understanding of many of the vulnerabilities a 
system. 
We examine various trust aspects of computer systems and introduce a 
definition of trust that we believe can help towards a greater 
understanding of system weaknesses. We propose that risk be 
considered as a measure of trust in a system; i.e. a measure of that 
which cannot be directly verified; rather than as a description of 
something that has bee be identified but not been provided for in the 
original design. 
1.5 Constitution of this dissertation 
In this chapter we have outlined the subject matter of this dissertation 
and provided some focus for the general topic areas covered. 
In Chapter 2 we outline some of the basic ideas, issues and concerns 
that can affect the operation and security of a distributed computer 
system, contrasted from a number of different viewpoints. 
In Chapter 3 we discuss the desired behaviour of a simple trusted 
message server and use this to introduce some of the design 
considerations and conflicts that can occur during implementation. 
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In Chapter 4 we examine a well-known cryptographic protocol and 
look at some of the trust issues involved in its use. 
In Chapter 5 we investigate a number of existing trust models, and 
compare their assumptions and differences as a means for examining 
matters of trust in computer-based systems. 
In Chapter 6 we consider the conflicts that can occur in a distributed 
environment between the design of system integrity and the design of 
data integrity, by examining some of the implementation issues arising 
from the common practice of sharing data and resources. 
In Chapter 7 we summarise our findings and point to further areas of 
research that can be developed as a follow-up to the work done in this 
dissertation; and the implications of our research for other areas of 
computer science. 
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"A shared secret is ,w longer a secret. » W. S. HarbisoJ 
Chapter2 
Security in Systems Design 
2.1 Introduction 
Traditionally, computer systems have been thought of as being 
comprised of hardware, software and data, and discussions of security 
issues have been confined mainly to these three components. 
The OECD defines an "information system" in much wider terms: as, 
collectively "computers, communication facilities, computer and 
communication networks and data and information that may be stored, 
processed, retrieved or transmitted by them, including programmes, 
specifications and procedures for their operation, use and 
maintenance" [OECD92]. 
Security of information systems can be generally described as the 
protection of the availability, confidentiality and integrity of the 
systems and their constituent parts. 
"Trusted Systems" were first discussed within the context of the 
security of military computer systems in the United States, and 
codified in the "Department of Defense Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria" [DOD85] - the "Orange Book". 
This work originated in studies instituted by the US Defence Science 
Board in October 1967 into computer security safeguards that would 
protect classified information in remote-access, resource-sharing 
computer systems. 
As such it seems reasonable to expect that the considerations resulting 
from this work should be of considerable relevance to many of today's 
computing environments. Indeed, the principles underlying the 
"Orange Book" have been widely used in the design of many 
commercial systems where security is considered to be an issue (a large 
5 We have subseq11mtly discovered that Benjamin Franklin had recorded an epigram [F 733 J of a similar, if somewhat 
blacker, nature: "Three may kup a secret if two of them are dead. ». This was based on a similar maxim from a 
contemporary of his, Edward Everett: "If you want yo11r secret kept, keep it~ 
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number of distributed and on-line systems in current use). 
It can be argued that military models of security are not always the 
most suitable basis for the design of a commercial open distributed 
system, given their predominant focus on secrecy and access controls. 
There is a concentration within military computer systems on the 
control of access to information: and these aspects are well- described 
in the "Orange Book". However, in the world at large this singular and 
specific concern is uncommon, and their are other and more general 
issues of security that arise and which are not particularly well 
addressed by such a restricted view6 . 
At the heart of the security considerations for a computer-based 
system is the concept of the existence of potential threats to the proper 
running and availability of the system and its data. That is, there is 
an assumption that some forms of adverse elements exist that could 
compromise the system in some manner, and that the security of the 
system could be vulnerable to such hostile action. 
We will see that different security regimes will presuppose different 
kinds of threat, and will act to provide safeguards only for their 
perceived vulnerabilities. It is usually clear what the perceived threats 
are thought to be, although it will be seen that these threats are 
seldom completely stated explicitly. This sometimes results in 
situations where particular security regimes can be shown to be 
vulnerable in ways that they would probably find to be unacceptable, 
were all the assumptions to be known in a complete and explicit 
manner. 
We will show that many security threats are made possible by an 
incomplete, and sometimes erroneous, understanding of the behaviour 
of the computer system by its designers, operators and users; and 
where the explicitly stated assumptions represent but a fraction of the 
total number of those that can affect the security of the system. This 
can result in the reliance on parts of the computer system that will be 
vulnerable forms of attack that otherwise would be known. 
6 Some of the limitations of the "Orange Book': particularly the nud for "interpretations» to extend its applicability, 
wert! subseqUl!ntly addressed in the "Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria» [CSSC93]. 
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2.2 Trust and Security 
It is often the case that many of the assumptions that affect the 
security of a particular computer system can be deduced only from the 
context in which that system's security mechanisms operate. That is, 
from observations of the actual operation of the system, rather than 
from its specifications; though as we shall see later, this is not as 
simple as might first appear. 
Many commercially developed UNIX systems have sought validation 
under the "Orange Book" criteria; and whilst this may have been 
motivated initially by a desire to supply "off the shelf' systems into 
sensitive government applications, such systems are also being offered 
in the general marketplace. We are of the opinion that this is not 
necessarily a beneficial development for commercial users. 
We have looked at the implications of applying the military-derived 
model of trusted systems to the more commercial world of distributed 
computer systems. We found that such application can result in a 
misconceived view of the overall security of a system. 
In particular, we note that the inter-connection of "Trusted Systems" 
does not of itself produce a system with the same security 
characteristics; and can lead to systems whose overall security is 
considerably less than that of its constituent components
7 
• 
Trust is considered by some to be a transitive property of a system
8 
[e.g. CB94]. We believe that to take such a view is to confuse a number 
of separate and distinct concepts such as trust, belief and reliance. We 
will give definitions and examples of these concepts which we believe 
will illustrate the differences between them. 
In particular we believe that there is confusion between the related 
concepts of trust and trustworthy. We propose that there is a 
distinction between these two concepts which we can summarise as: 
"trust is something I do; trustworthy is something it is". 
In other words, "trust" could be considered to relate to a state of 
knowledge of a principal in the system, whereas "trustworthy'' relates 
7 We should point out that we are concerned here to highlight issues of bad design practice rather than with the notion of 
composability (see for example [CSFWB ]). 
8 A relationship(-,) is said to be transitive when the following holds: if A-,B and B-,C then A-,C 
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to a property of some entity within the system (which could include a 
principal). 
Another way of attempting to quantify the concept of trust is to look at 
the value to us of what is being trusted "letting us down". We can 
.consider that to trust something is to "risk" the cost of what we are 
trusting going wrong. That is, trust can be quantified by the (negative) 
value recovering the situation. 
From this viewpoint, the study of trust can be considered to include the 
study of those risks that are accepted, knowingly or not, within a given 
system or component part of a system. 
Trust then becomes a statement about the subjective position of one 
party in a system to other parties and components. It is therefore 
quite possible for two or more principals to have different views on 
trusting something within a system. 
With better knowledge and understanding of what is being trusted in 
this regard - and therefore what is being risked - we will be in a 
position to make more considered judgments on the balance of risks 
versus costs. 
It is usual to think that we trust what we know - a good friend, our 
house not to collapse, etc9 • What we are "trusting'' here is consistency 
of behaviour: but consistency is not the same as certainty; and a 
prediction is not the same as fact. We suggest that "consistency of 
behaviour", which we often see used as a measure of trust, is better 
considered to be the (related) concept of "trustworthy''. 
We propose that, in contrast to this view, the concept of trust is better 
associated with the idea of what we don't know rather than what we 
do know. It can therefore be considered as a substitute for knowledge 
instead of a representation of it. Considered together with the notion 
of the existence of many different and valid viewpoints of a system, 
trust can be seen to be a subjective concept . 
With this in mind, we suggest that we progress in our understanding 
of a system when we find ways of reducing our trust in it, of 
9 In his recent book, Frances Fukuyama considers trust to be "the expectation that arises within a community of regular, 
honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community [F95r. 
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quantifying the costs of our (misplaced) trust and by seeking ways to 
replace trust with knowledge. In order for us to do this we first must 
understand the extent to which we are actually trusting the system. 
It is not our aim to write a philosophical dissertation, and we therefore 
do not intend to enter into a detailed discussion concerning the nature 
of knowledge and truth. We rely, instead, on an intuitive 
understanding of these terms. 
It is unlikely that we can ever have complete knowledge of anything in 
the real world - and we therefore have to use only as much knowledge 
and reasoning as is appropriate to the given situation. As an example, 
we usually "trust" a keyboard to generate the code we expect from our 
in-built assumptions. If we were to depress a "Q" key on a keyboard 
we would expect it to generate the appropriate code for the letter "Q". 
If, however, the keyboard had been configured to the French language 
it would generate the code for the letter "N'. 
When the keyboard is connected to a computer, it is usual for there to 
be some kind of visual feedback which would display the letter the code 
had generated; i.e. the letter "Q" or "A" would appear on a display; and 
we would then have a confirmation of our input. 
However, it is worth noting that this feedback is usually only logically 
coupled to the key depression and is not necessarily coupled physically. 
The importance of this can be shown when considering what might 
happen in the case of a cash dispenser. 
An intermediate (and unknown oO device could be interposed in -such a 
way as to relay the responses we are expecting back to us, while 
having a d.I:fferent set of dialogues with the central computer to which 
we think we are directly connected. 
It is also possible that the cash dispenser itself is entirely bogus (as 
shown in a recent court case [R95]) and be merely emulating the real 
device, even to the extent of giving out cash. 
In both of the above cases the user will have "trusted" the device to do 
what was expected by the user, but it has actually done something 
entirely different to those expectations. 
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2.3 Summary 
Being explicitly aware of what we are trusting can enable us to design 
strategies for coping with possible risks. In the case of the cash 
dispenser, a suitable challenge/response protocol, coupled to a 
smartcard incorporating its own keyboard, can provide a high level of 
protection against the risks described. Whether such strategies are 
economically justifiable will vary from case to case and with the cost of 
recovering the potential loss. 
In summary, we propose that to understand trust we need to 
understand the limitations of our knowledge. In contrast to what is 
often believed, we are proposing that trust is relative; and rather than 
being the result of knowledge, is in fact, a substitute for knowledge. 
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"Lookers-on many times see more than gamesters" - Francis Bacon. Essays, 48. 
Chapter3 
A Trusted Message Server 
3.1 Introduction 
To understand what fundamental requirements are necessary in the 
provision of a trusted message service, we begin by initially looking at 
a simple system that deals only with the retrieval of a message. 
So as not to complicate our understanding of the various relationships 
involved, we start at the point where the message has already been 
made available to the server. For the purposes of this discussion we 
make the assumption that the message has been delivered to the 
server in a secure manner. 
We wish to examine what is meant by the statement that the message 
server is trusted to deliver a message to the appropriate party10 • 
3.2 Single Message - Single Recipient 
Let us consider the following situation. ALF is travelling away from 
home base and is not in a position to establish or to maintain contact 
. on a reliable basis during these travels. It has therefore been agreed 
beforehand that if it is necessary to contact ALF during this time, then 
a message will be left at a predetermined location. ALF has 
undertaken to check the agreed location at regular intervals. We refer 
to this message delivery mechanism as the Trusted Message Server 
(TMS). 
We would like to consider what steps are necessary in order to ensure 
the intended successful outcome of this process11 • 
10 We shall see very shortly that this qw:stion alone is not simply determined. We need to ask ftom which viewpoint this 
is beinl( discussed. 
11 There is an implication here that only one of the possible outcomes is the correct one. We will return to this point 
later. [n.b.: The measure of a successful outcome depends upon secondary criteria - see later discussion on whether the 
message should be destroyed if the IMS is tampered with. There is a strong case to be made, I think, that a relationship 
exists between desired outcome under adverse conditions, and what is sometimes known as security policy. Clearly a 
number of differing outcomes can be considered. These can be related to a number of difforent security policies; whether 
overtly stated, or maybe just implied.] 
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It should be noted that for the purposes of the following discussion, we 
make no assumptions on whether the message is encrypted or 
otherwise. At this stage our concern is with the correct delivery of the 
message to the designated recipient. We would therefore like to 
establish those criteria needed to characterise the successful outcome 
of this procedure. 
In an ideal world, and with no adverse conditions, a successful outcome 
to the delivery of the message could be could be considered to have 
occurred when: 
1. It is apparent to ALF that a message has arrived. 
2. ALF's identity is accepted by the TMS. 
3. The TMS (correctly)12 delivers the message to ALF. 
These are clearly necessary conditions, and by some they might be 
considered to be sufficient. However, in a non-ideal world, it is 
probable that not all circumstances are favourable and not all agents 
are benign. Therefore, even at this stage it is instructive to look at this 
situation in a little more detail. 
It has been stated that we are looking for the successful outcome to 
message delivery. There are, however, a number of possible viewpoints 
from .which to judge this outcome, namely: 
1. The originator of the message. 
11. ALF. 
111. The TMS. 
1v. An intruder. 
v. An impartial observer, which we will refer to as DEM. 13 
We shall examine what points of commonality there exist for these 
viewpoints. If it transpires that they are not all equivalent then we 
will then be faced with the problem of from which viewpoint the 
outcome should be judged; and why. 
Let us start by looking at the assumptions we have so far made: 
12 The use of the term "co"e.ctly "here refers to the integrity of transcription of the message. 
13 It is assumed that the DEM has a compkte view of all principals, systems and activities within this universe of 
discourse. 
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Al. The existence of the Message Server. 
A2. The existence of ALF at the time of delivery of the message. 
A3. The existence of a non-hostile environment. 
If we now examine in turn the consequences of each of these 
assumptions not being true: 
nAl. The absence of the message server can mean 
1. The message server does not exist14 ; 
11. There is no message; 
111. The message server has been removed or destroyed. 
nA2. The absence of ALF can mean 
i. ALF has not arrived; 
11. ALF has arrived but not checked for some reason. 15 
111. ALF arrived but has moved-on (or returned to base); 
nA3. The existence of a possibly hostile environment could lead 
to a large number of possibilities16 , including: 
1. The message has been replaced by a substitute one; 
11. The message server has been removed or destroyed; 
111. ALF has been apprehended or destroyed. 
Clearly, these are only indicative of the kind of events that could occur 
under various circumstances. Our original and relatively simple 
considerations seem now to have grown into something rather complex 
and somewhat obscure. What are we to make of all of these 
possibilities? 
The problems seemed to proliferate when we started to consider events 
when things might possibly go wrong. Let us go back to our original 
problem. 
We can see that if everything is assumed to be right and if all 
necessary conditions for success are fulfilled then the conditions for the 
u There are a number of reasons why this might be the case including deception. 
15 There are a large number of reasons that could be conside"d including a) ALF has got the place and/or time wrong; 
b) ALF has been apprehended; c) ALF has been destroyed 
16 Some of these possibilities are similar to those of the case where ALF is absent. It should be noted tha.t depending upon 
what is assumed to have ha.ppened then a different set of end conditions may be sought. Refer to subsequent discussion of 
security policies. 
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required outcome are quite simple and few in number. This is a 
serious number of "ifs" and might not be what we really want to rely 
on. 
We have already noted that there is not just one viewpoint from which 
to look at this situation. Therefore, in examining the issues involved 
from different possible viewpoints let us start by considering two 
possible characteristics of success. The successful delivery of a 
message to the server, and the successful retrieval of a message by the 
rightful addressee. 
In looking at what constitutes successful delivery, we would like to 
start by examining this from the two viewpoints of the TMS and the 
message originator, respectively. 
We could therefore consider some additional requirements, which 
might be thought desirable but have not yet been stated explicitly. We 
might like to ensure that only ALF be aware that a message has 
arrived, and that only ALF has access to the message. 
Explicitly, then: 
A4. There should be no externally verifiable evidence of a 
message being left (external, that is, to ALF and TMS). 
A5. Only ALF should be able to retrieve the message. 
These two conditions could be regarded as adding concepts of "privacy'' 
and "secrecy''. 17 
Thus far we have tried to outline the conditions for ALF to receive the 
message "discretely'' and for it not to be given out to another party by 
"mistake". ]f we continue to develop this line of reasoning then we 
might envisage a hostile environment where others actively seek ALF 
and the message. 
Attempting to counter such possible active threats might lead us to 
add the following conditions 18 : 
17 By secret here we mean that the message is not readabk by any party other than ALF. 
18 Note that we have assumed (cf AC5) that the original message could not have bun retrieved by an other party. 
However, it is possibk that it may have bun removed or replaced by another mmaKe, 
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A6. ALF should be able to distinguish the situations of no 
message from that of a destroyed or removed message. 
A 7: ALF should be able to distinguish between a correct 
message and a counterfeit message. 
These conditions could be considered to cover such concepts as "denial 
of service" and "message substitution". 
The seven conditions listed above are not the only ones that we might 
have produced; they are, however, representative of those that need to 
be considered, particularly in environments whose characteristics may 
not be ideal, and which might also be considered to be hostile. 
We have now moved some way from our initial simple problem and it is 
probably worthwhile summarising the discussion so far of our basic 
message system. 
1. It appears that three simple conditions will satisfy the initial 
problem statement. 
2. Four additional conditions were then introduced to counter 
possible threats that might arise if the environment in which the 
service operates, can be considered to be hostile to some degree. 
3. In addition, we have seen the usefulness of adding to such 
frequently used ideas such as message, recipient, etc., the 
concepts of: 
Cl: Outcome. 
C2: Viewpoint. 
C3: Environment. 
It will be seen that these three concepts will come to play an 
increasingly important part in our subsequent discussions on the 
nature of trust and its relationship to the various parties involved. 
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3~3 The TMS' Viewpoint 
In a manner similar to that of ALF's we need to look from the point of 
view of the Message Delivery Service at what constitutes the basic 
requirements for successful message transmission. 
Ml. The TMS must be able to indicate that a message has arrived. 
M2. ALF (correctly) identifies himself. 
M3. ALF (correctly) receives the message. 
[n.b.: The TMS should also not allow its message to be extracted by any 
unauthorised means.] 
These conditions mirror the first three conditions for ALF. In addition 
we might also like to consider the following situations: 
M4. The TMS should be able to distinguish a situation where ALF 
is seeking to retrieve the message, but doing so under duress. 
M5. The TMS must be able to distinguish ALF from an impostor. 
M6. The TMS must ensure that following a successful retrieval by 
ALF the message is no longer available19 • 
It is also possible to consider that under certain circumstances either 
or both of the TMS and ALF may wish to prove to a third party that 
the message was delivered or received (both respectively - and not), if 
duplicitness is to be a consideration. 
It should be pointed out at this stage that there are other viewpoints 
from which an examination of this example could be conducted. 
1. Ours. The (dispassionate and) remote observer. 
2. An involved observer (seeking to record for future use). 
3. An Intruder (seeking to alter or destroy). 
An examination of any particular exchange will not necessarily result 
in the same observations or conclusions20• 
19 It is worth noting that in some systems tk continued storage of a message following delivery to the recipient is 
considered a benefit. It must now be obvious that this can kad to additional risks if secrecy is considered to be 
important. 
20 Su discussion of known plaintext attack of Needham-Schroeder. 
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3e4 Rules For Successful Delivery 
The following are a set of rules that could be applied to the Message 
Delivery Server (TMS) to achieve the major objective: 
1. The procedure will be used once only21• 
2. The message is to be delivered to ALF and to no one else. 
3. Upon correct delivery the TMS will destroy itself and any 
message. 
4. Any message not retrieved within a given time period will cause 
the TMS to destroy itself and any message. 
5. Any attempt to retrieve the message by persons unrecognised by 
the server will cause the TMS to destroy itself and any message. 
6. Any attempt to tamper with the TMS will cause it to destroy itself 
and any message. 
We can reasonably deduce from the above that this set of rules 
embodies the consideration that the secrecy of the message is more 
important than the delivery of the message when there could be a 
conflict between the two. 
A system based on these rules will seek to enforce the principle that if 
a threat to the integrity of the system is perceived, then it will be 
preferable that no one - and that includes ALF - should retrieve the 
message, than that the possibility is allowed for the message to fall 
into unauthorised hands. 
Clearly a clifferent set of rules would need to be applied if it were 
deemed to be more important that ALF should receive the message 
than to protect it against any form of unauthorised disclosure. 
It should be possible to reverse this thinking and to deduce the 
particular requirements pertaining to a specific protocol 
implementation from an analysis of its workings. 
21 It has bun suggested that these procedures be considered on a ''per message" basis rather than once only. This will 
lead to a si,:ni_ficantly different and more complex protocol than that considered here. 
Trusting in Computer Systems 26 
Such a set of rules can be likened to the concept of a Security Policy22, 
which consists of a set of rules within which the applicable process or 
procedure should operate, but which do not of themselves form part of 
the process or procedure. 
We can see this in the example above where we can change the 
security policy (rules) without changing the procedure for message 
delivery. This could clearly result in a different possible overall 
outcome in the event of an attack on the system or some form of system 
malfunction. 
3.5 Summary 
The above analysis was undertaken on what is a relatively simple 
security model compared to many in actual operation. What we see, 
however, is that in common with other models there are a significant 
number of undocumented assumptions that must be made in order for 
the model to perform at all. 
We have also seen that in even such a simple model as this, these 
assumptions can have a major effect both on the operation of the 
system, and also on the determination of the outcome; successful, or 
otherwise. 
There are many security protocols in regular use in large numbers of 
systems and networks that are of considerably more complexity than 
the ones discussed above. These protocols are all purported to provide 
secure communications of one kind or another. 
We believe that a systematic analysis of these protocols in a similar 
manner to tha~ illustrated above is likely to reveal several assumptions 
that have not been explicitly documented, and which are critically 
necessary to the correct running of the protocol. 
The lack of understanding of these fundamental assumptions when the 
protocol is being implemented is, in turn, likely to leave the systems in 
which they have been implemented vulnerable to · (previously 
undocumented) attacks. 
22 The existence of an explicit and well-defined security policy enforced by the system is a requirement for a secure computer system [DOD85]. See also [S91] for a discussion of some of the issues concerninx"Security Policies". 
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We give an illustration of this in the analysis of the Needham-
Schroeder protocol in a later chapter. 
Some of the uncertainties encountered by the use of an extremely 
simple protocol in the previous discussion on the message server can be 
ameliorated by making changes to the protocol. For instance, we could 
extend the protocol by adding a message from the sender that states 
that a message has not been been sent, if that is the case. The 
question then arises as to whether this changes the trust 
relationships. 23 
Although this would clearly be a different situation, it would look the 
same using the traditional notion of trust, being an "objective" system 
property; and the trust relationships would remain unaltered. 
We contend, however, that the answer to the question above must be 
yes; since new messages will introduce new uncertainties into the 
system, as well as new information. 
The consideration of trust as a property of a system can therefore be 
seen to provide a less powerful concept for the analysis of security 
weaknesses in computer-based systems than the concept that we have 
proposed in this dissertation. 
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"He ~as a gentleman on whom I built an absolute trust "Shakespeare. Macbeth, 1 iv 
Chapter4 
Analysis of Security Protocols 
4.1 Introduction 
We would like to start by looking at the Needham-Schroeder Protocol 
[NS78], which is one of the first, simplest and most successful of 
cryptographic security protocols. It is a protocol that has been adopted 
as the basis for many operational security systems. This includes the 
Kerberos Authentication Server, created in the Athena Project at MIT 
[T88], utilised in what is perhaps the most prominent strong 
authentication service in wide use today [MNSS87, KN93]. 
We show how the inappropriate application of the Needham-Schroeder 
protocol can allow novel attacks on the protocol to be mounted. We 
have not found the two attacks discussed below to have been 
considered elsewhere. 
4.2 Needham .. Schroeder Protocol 
Needham and Schroeder [NS78] were among the first to consider the 
use of cryptographic protocols for the authentication of communicating 
parties · where secure computer communication in large networks is 
desired. Their paper states that within the context of secure computer 
communications, the term "authentication" means verifying the 
identity of the communicating principals to one another24 • 
We note that this definition of authentication does not encompass the 
issue of the verification of the transactions between principals. The 
linked issues of when and how sessions end are similarly outside the 
scope of the publication. (We would like to return to these issues later, 
as we believe them to be of crucial importance in the overall context of 
secure communications in computer networks.) 
24 ef. COD definitions: 
Secure means safo against attack, impregnable, reliable, certain not to foil or give way. 
Verify means to establish the truth or correctness (of) by examination or demonstration. 
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Three functions are discussed in the Needham - Schroeder paper: 
1. Establishing an authenticated interactive communication. 2. Authenticated one-way communication (such as mail). 3. Signed communication for authentication of origin and integrity by a third party. 
It 1s stated that secure communications in physically vulnerable networks depend upon encryption of material. Assumptions made are that an intruder can alter, copy, replay parts of, or all, messages; and can also emit false messages. 
The protocol implicitly assumes that the principals have a secure environment in which to operate, and is designed only for those situations where a mutual choice of secure communications has been made, and no forms of compulsion are involved. Mechanisms that may be required to enforce compliance or to restrict information flows are not within the scope of the paper. 
Needham and Schroeder have therefore consciously restricted themselves to looking at what could be considered to be a small and relatively simple subset of all of the possible functions that could be considered within the context of secure communications in large networks of computers. 
It should be noted that Needham and Schroeder quite clearly state that their protocols should be regarded as examples that expose the issues of authentication in large networks and should not be looked on as fully engineered solutions to the overall security problems of particular applications. 
As we shall s_ee, even within such a restricted domain the issues involving the security of the communications between the principals involved can get quite complicated very quickly. 
Needham & Schroeder presuppose, not unreasonably, that the use of authentication servers is necessary for the provision of a source of authoritative information on the keys belonging to the principals using large networks. We shall see that the introduction of a third party into the communication between principals can lead to unforeseen consequences for the security of that communication. 
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Keys are shared between the principals and the server respectively. 
New session keys are generated by the server for each session. These 
keys "must be unpredictable and should never have been used before". 
It is not stated how this is to be achieved. The server could 
precompute keys and "remember" which key it has issued to whom; or 
an algorithm could be devised which accomplishes the requirement 
automatically and reliably. Professor Needham has suggested (in a 
private communication) that a physical random number generator 
would suffice. The adequacy of such a system would depend upon the 
specific implementation and key space, since a birthday attack could be 
possible [S92]. 
It is also not stated as to whether the session key requirements are 
meant to apply only in the context of a specific pair of principals, or 
whether they apply globally to all of the principals of a particular 
authentication server. 
4.3 Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key Protocol 
In the symmetric-key protocol, where the same key is used for both the 
encryption and the decryption, authentication depends upon the two 
principals being the only two who know the key that is being used. 
Apart from, that is, possibly also the ("trusted") servers. 
In the following protocol descriptions the notation used will be that 
described in the original paper: encryption is indicated by braces that 
are superscripted with the key used. 
Protocol 1. 
1. A - ~ 
2. AS ~ 
3. A ~ 
AS: A,B,IA1 
A: {I Al,B' CK, { CK,A}KB}KA 
B: {CK,A}KB 
It is stated that the recipient's name must appear in message 2. The 
reason given is that otherwise an intruder could intercept message 1. 
and replace B's address with that of a different addressee (say) X . As 
an exercise in understanding some of the complex issues involved in 
the design and analysis of security protocols we shall examine this in 
a little more detail. 
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In order to better understand the dynamics of the . intrusion we have 
found it useful to introduce a new notation: square brackets, [ ], denote 
the presence and activities of an intruder in the system. This notation 
is used within the following message to illustrate how the intruder, 
denoted by X, might operate. 
1J sing the notation referred to above, the substitution attack that is 
possible where the recipient's name has not been included in message 
2, is represented as follows: 
4. A ~ [X: A,B,IA1 
' 
X JE] AS: A,X,h1 
5. AS ~ A: {/A1,CK,{CK,A}KX}KA 
6. A ~ [X: {CK,A}KX] (which X can decrypt of course) 
7. X ~ {message}cK A: 
In message 4 the intruder X is monitoring A's communications. It 
intercepts A's message, substitutes its own identity for that of B, and 
forwards the modified message to the authentication server. 
In message 5 the authentication server sends the session key to be 
used, encrypted with X~ key. Without a specific reference to the 
recipient in this message from the authentication server A has no way 
of knowing that the session is being set up withX and not with B. 
In message 6 A sends the session key to what A believes to be B; but X 
intercepts once again, and is of course able to decode the message since 
it has been encrypted withX's own key. 
In message 7 X then begins transmission directly with A using the 
session key requested by A for communication with B. 
In fact, what we see has happened is that communication has been 
established between A and X. A believes it is talking to B, and B 
knows nothing about the proposed communication that A wished to 
establish with B. 
A could now find itself in a very difficult position. There will be no 
independent record that the original request was made for 
communication with B. 
If the authentication server keeps records of session key requests then 
these records will show (c.f. message 4) that A (apparently) requested 
Trusting in Computer Systems 32 
communication withX despite whatA might claim andA's own records 
might (purport to) show. 
This demonstrates the importance in the analysis of protocols such as 
this of considerations such as whether the authentication server does 
or does not possess state. In the example of the attack discussed above 
we can see that if the server has state then the initial damage done by 
the intrusion can be compounded by the server seemingly being able to 
verify a bogus transaction. 
With the addition of the recipient's address in the second message of 
the protocol, a substitution of the recipient (as shown in message 4) 
can be detected by A on receipt of that message. 
4.4 Denial of Service Attack 
There are other types of attack, however, to which the Needham-
Schroeder protocol may still be susceptible. With the protocol as 
specified we observe that the first message is in the clear. This can 
give rise to the possibility of a denial of service attack. 
Let us consider the first message of the protocol; and using the same 
notation as before: 
8. A ~ [X: A,B,h1 ; X JE] AS : A,X,h1 
The second message of the protocol will now become: 
9. AS ~ A: ffA1)(,CK,{CK,A}KX}KA 
Upon decrypting this, A will be able to see that the recipient is now 
stated to be X, i.e. a different principal to that of the original request, 
namely B; and will be able to deduce that something has happened to 
the original request. 
However, it is still not necessarily possible at this stage, for A to 
conclude that the original request has been intercepted and that the 
identity of X has been substituted for that of B. 
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A might conceive of the possibility that the original message has been 
corrupted in some manner before being received by AS, and that this 
might have resulted in the mistaken identity of the originator. A 
might also conceive (perhaps more seriously) of the possibility that the 
substitution has been made by the authentication server itself; either 
accidentally or even deliberately. 
Whatever the interpretation assumed by A of why it received a wrong 
message, it is clear that if message 9 is the only response that A 
receives then the only possibility for communication available to A will 
be withX. 
If X has control of the network it is clearly always possible for the 
intruder to deny A completely the possibility of communications. 
However, in the attack we have just described, we can see that it is 
possible for an intruder to use the properties of a cryptographic 
protocol (in this case the Needham-Schroeder Protocol) to deny A the 
possibility of communication with B, without needing to have control of 
the communications network. 
There are clearly a number of variations on this attack, including that 
where an intruder substitutes for A itself (or simply blocks the first 
message from A) thereby ensuring that A is totally denied service of 
any kind. An intruder can also selectively target principals with whom 
A wishes to communicate, and thus deny access to specific principals or 
groups of principals by A (and only A, if this is what is desired). 
These attacks could conceivably be avoided by the complete encryption 
of message 1. (However, it is clear that if A's messages are blocked 
completely then nothing can prevent denial of service to A . Though it 
is likely to be obvious to A if this were to be the case.) 
If message 1 were to be encrypted then clearly there is a penalty to 
paid for this in the time taken to do the encryption; and an even 
greater burden placed on the authentication server by the requirement 
for the larger number of decryptions necessary to handle all of the 
principals it serves. 
In addition, complete encryption can cause difficulties for the 
authentication server in identifying the message originator. This could 
be done on the basis of a known transmission channel or transmission 
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time; or even by exhaustive search, though this is clearly not very 
practical if a large number of principals are involved. 
It is sometimes assumed that all encrypted messages are accompanied 
by enough cleartext information to enable the authentication server to 
make the appropriate key selection, and that this could apply in the 
c~se of the complete encryption of message 1. It is clear from the above 
discussion of denial of service that any information in the clear, and 
especially that which could potentially identify the sender is also 
capable of being subverted by an intruder. 
Of perhaps more concern to the users of systems employing 
cryptographic means of secure communications are those networks 
where the network itself adds information identifying the originator of 
the message without the knowledge of the users. In this case it is 
possible for the user to erroneously believe that it can protect its 
identity from intruders by such means as the complete encryption of 
all messages as discussed above. If the system now adds identifying 
information to the messages then there is again another opportunity 
for an intruder to confound the desired communications. 
In many systems it is also common for a situation to occur where the 
user might know that such identifying information is added, but is not 
on a position to stop such information being added. This topic is one 
which is worthy of further discussion but is not within the immediate 
scope of subject of this thesis. 
If we return to the discussion of the consequences of an authentication 
server possessing state, then it is easy to see from discussions similar 
to those outlined above for the case of an intruder, that it would be 
possible for the server itself to masquerade as any one of the principals. 
4.5 Known-plaintext Attack 
Whilst Needham & Schroeder caution against regarding their protocols 
as fully engineered solutions to the overall security problems of 
particular applications, they also mention that the protocols provide an 
adequate solution to the authentication problems specified by them. 
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They go on to note that their protocols would need elaboration to meet 
a number of other security goals and go on to specifically mention that 
of "withholding all matching cleartext-ciphertext pairs from an 
eavesdropper". 
It is clearly of importance to understand the problems that can occur 
from attacks that can be made by intruders in a system. We feel that 
(especially) within the context of this thesis, it is of considerable 
importance to understand that attacks can also be made by legitimate 
participants in the system. These participants have the potential to 
subvert the system in a very serious manner - and at a very different 
level of trust - using the protocol's own capabilities to achieve this, and 
often with no possibility of detection. 
Within this context, the Needham-Schroeder protocol is vulnerable to a 
known-plaintext attack that can be made by one principal to discover 
the key of another principal within the system. 
Looking at the first two messages of the protocol we see that A is in a 
position to make a known-plaintext attack on B's key at the point 
where the second message is decrypted. The protocol could allow A to 
accumulate a large number of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs for 
subsequent analysis of B's key, by requesting many sessions from the 
authentication server. If A discontinues each session at message 2 
then B is never in a position to know what A is attempting. 
If the authentication server possessed state then it could be possible to 
determine that such an attempt had been made by a subsequent 
analysis of the authentication server's logs. In this case state can help 
to disclose the attack. 
It is clear froi;n this that the various participants in - as well, of course, 
as the designers and implementers of - this system believe that a large 
number of elements of the system will behave in quite specific ways in 
specific circumstances26 • The correct operation of the system relies on 
these beliefs being true. 
25 It is perhaps more correct to say that the participants behave in ways that are consistent with holding these beliefs. In 
general it is not possible to know what is actually believed, but only to rkduce this from what is stated or from observed 
behaviour. It is always possible, of course, for a participant to believe one thing but to behave as if other beliefs were 
true, for the purposes of rkception. 
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Assumptions would appear to be made by participating parties that 
systems elements also possess specific properties, and to trust them in 
these regards. Most of these assumptions and beliefs are specified 
neither by the protocol nor by explicit description of the system. 
Within the context of our concept of trust we could state the 
vulnerability to a known-plaintext attack as described above as: "a 
principal in the system trusts all other principals in the system not to 
mount a known-plaintext attack on their key". 
4.6 Summary 
Discussions like these suggest that when we see a protocol statement 
such as: 
Pl. A~ B : {message}, 
we should perhaps ask the question: "what is the meaning of this 
statement?"; for we have already observed that it can mean different 
things to different people. In particular, it is not clear that it has a 
common and unambiguous meaning to: 
i. the protocol designer, 
ii. the protocol implementer, 
iii. A, 
iv. B, 
v. · an intruder (X) 
vi. a (disinterested) third-party observer. 
As a simple example: 
1. the protocol designer might have intended that the statements 
should read as "A sends a message to B which B receives"; 
u. the protocol implementer may implement this as ''A sends 
message toB"; 
iii. A may understand the statement as ''A sends a message to B 
which no one else reads"; 
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iv. B might understand the statement to mean that the message 
sent to Bis guaranteed to have come from A"; 
v. An intruder such as X might believe that the message is 
encrypted with A's key shared with B. 
vi. A disinterested third-party might observe that all that is 
intended is that A originates · a message which is intended to be 
transmitted to B by some unspecified communication channel. 
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"Put not your trust in Princes, nor in any child of man " - (Psalms cxlvi. 2) 
Chapter5 
Trust and Computer Systems 
5.1 Introduction 
We have chosen to discuss the concept of trust as it relates to an 
analysis of the security of computer-based systems. One of our 
contentions, which we develop below, is that the term is not always 
used in a consistent manner. We refer to Appendix I for illustration of 
some of the ways in which the term "trust" is used26• 
We believe that there is sometimes merit in noting the distinction 
between a formal definition of a term and its somewhat more colloquial 
usage. It is often the case that the (different) usages relate to different 
views of the system: for example, the manner in which the system is 
defined to behave by the designer, and the manner in which it is 
observed to behave by the user. In our experience, these viewpoints 
are seldom co-incident. 
We would maintain that a definition seeks to embody a viewpoint. It's 
importance is not that all must necessarily agree with the particular 
viewpoint, but that (significantly) different viewpoints should require 
distinctly different definitions. 
The adoption of a particular (and related) set of definitions gives rise to 
a specific model of a system whose description it is sought to provide. 
It is the relationship of any such model (that is, its value) to perceived 
experience (tp.at is, perceived "reality''), that is used to judge the 
ultimate usefulness of the model (that is, the consistency between 
experience and belief). 
We present below two basic and different models of trust as applied to 
computer-based systems. Although we have observed a recent increase 
in the discussion of trust and computer systems [e.g. · BFL96], the 
overwhelming deliberations over the past few years have concentrated 
on the application of the "Orange Book" model to commercial open 
26 This particular collection is courtesy of Michael Roe. 
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distributed computer systems. 
We think that the application of the military model of computer 
security as presented in the "Orange Book" is seldom appropriate to 
commercial open distributed systems, and we present our arguments 
below. 
5.2 Trusted Computer Systems 
Trusted systems were first discussed within the context of the security 
of military computer systems in the United States; as described in the 
"Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria' 
[DOD85] - the "Orange Book". 
This work originated in studies instituted by the US Defence Science 
Board in October 1967 into computer security safeguards that would 
protect classified information in remote-access, resource-sharing 
computer systems. As such it would be reasonable to expect that the 
considerations resulting from this work should be of considerable 
relevance to many of today's computing environments. 
There is, however, a concentration within military systems on the 
control of access to information. Within the world at large this 
singular focus is uncommon, and more general issues of security arise 
which we note later and which are not particularly well addressed by 
such a restricted view of what constitutes security in a computer-based 
system. 
We find that the presentation of trust in the "Orange Book", treats 
trust as being essentially a system-based concept. We also observe 
that it is implicit in the way the concept is used in the context of the 
"Orange Book" that there is considered to be just one viewpoint from 
which trust, and the security of a system, is to be judged. 
Within military systems adhering to the "Orange Book" precepts, trust 
is directly associated with access to information, and the associated 
controls for achieving this. Much work has been done on the design of 
"trusted" systems and components which implement these concepts, 
and many feel that the implementation of sophisticated access control 
systems provides for sufficient security of a computer-based system. 
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The principles underlying the'Orange Book' have also been widely used 
in the design of many commercial systems where security is considered 
to be an issue. We believe, however, that military models of security, 
with their predominant emphasis on secrecy and access controls, are 
not always the most suitable basis for the design of an open distributed 
commercial system. 
The 'Orange Book' sets out to deal with security issues relating to 
"remote-access, resource-sharing computer systems". However, in 
comparison to commercial systems of similar nature, the military 
systems are more likely to be closed systems in the way that they are 
implemented. They will derive from a common design; implementing 
similar security policies, design rules and control structures. 
The "Orange Book" model relies upon there being a well-defined 
security boundary around the system; with a clear differentiation 
between what is trusted being inside the security boundary, and what 
is not trusted being on outside of it. 
In a commercial environment, it is often the case that considerations of 
integrity, reproducibility, verifiability and availability of information 
are frequently as important as considerations of secrecy and control of 
access to information that are the paramount concerns to be found in 
the military environment. 
As a case in point, we can observe that concentration on secrecy may 
result in an environment where concealment of behaviour that can 
threaten the security of the system can be quite easy to accomplish. It 
might be argued that in many circumstances, a concentration on 
openness and verifiability, rather than secrecy, will result in systems 
that are intrinsically more secure against many of the threats that are 
found to occur_ within typical commercial environments. 
One of the fundamental motivating factors behind the implementation 
of open distributed computing systems is the desire to share common 
resources between different users. It is inevitable that different users 
will have different requirements and priorities, and it is therefore 
unavoidable that at the outset of the design of such systems there will 
be a conflict of interests. The idea of a common security boundary in 
this context could therefore be of only limited value. 
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It seems to us that the idea that it is the system boundary that defines 
what is trusted and what is not has little match with the realities of 
the requirements of the different users, principals and systems 
components in open distributed computer systems. 
Systems which are designed, implemented and operated by separate 
o_rganisations, are unlikely to have a common, unique boundary, with a 
single "inside" and "outside". It is therefore likely that the primary 
source of threat to such systems will arise from the activities of a 
participant who is, for certain specific purposes, an "insider". 
The "enemy within", a participant within the system - though not 
necessarily inside any specific component of the system, with 
knowledge of how the system works and where the absence of 
uniformity of interpretation and control has resulted in weaknesses in 
the security of the overall system, will be in a strong position to 
threaten the security of the system. 
It is worth examining what is typically taken on trust in current 
systems: servers of various kinds, shared libraries and software 
components, shared data bases, communications networks, etc. We 
observe that different participants will consider different things to be 
trusted in a distributed system; and most, if not all, of these 
components will outside the direct control of most users. 
Trust, by definition, is not a guarantee. Therefore an approach to 
understanding trust is also one of assessing risk. This leads us to 
question whether trust should be a local or a global consideration; and 
whether it is an objective or a subjective concept. 
The "Orange Book" approach is to seek to put all of the security-related 
aspects of a c9mputer system inside a "Trusted Computer Base' (TCB) 
whose features are considered to be "operative, correct, tamperproof 
under all circumstances". This is stated to be achieved variously 
through rigorous analysis, the design and implementation structures, 
and testing. Systems conforming to the "Orange Book" are considered 
"trusted". 
We question the utility of these concepts being applied to commercial 
open distributed computer systems. We believe that the contexts to 
which the "Orange Book" precepts apply differ significantly from those 
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in which commercial distributed systems are implemented. 
The TCB idea of placing all security related components inside a 
common boundary and then of verifying the "trustworthiness" of this 
construct does not seem to us to be particularly relevant to the design 
of open distributed systems; indeed it might well be considered to be 
the very antithesis of the open distributed concept. 
In a distributed system, it is very likely that different states of 
knowledge will exist in different parts of the system. There will be 
distinct designs, operators and users, and different assumptions will be 
made in the the use of protocols and (where it is used) cryptography. 
We observe that it is a specific characteristic of an open distributed 
system is that it will exhibit independent failure modes. Different 
parts of the system can fail in ways that not only are not related to 
each other, but are not necessarily detectable, for what they are, by 
other components. 
The appropriateness of applying a system designed for one context to a 
different context, without very careful analysis, must be open to 
serious objections. There can be large differences in the assumptions 
underlying the applicability and operation of the two systems; and this 
can introduce elements of risk, and also give rise to operational 
behaviour and failure modes, that are not properly understood by the 
system's implementers, operators and users, either collectively or 
individually. 
This is particularly so in the design of open distributed systems, where 
distributing what was originally a "closed" system operation can 
dramatically increase the complexity and risks involved. For example, 
replicating Trusted Computing Bases (TCBs), and linking them by 
networks (even ones that are encrypted) does not of necessity result in 
a system as secure as the original, closed TCB. 
This can result in an insecure system being constructed from 
individually secure components. An illustration of this was given at 
the 1994 Cambridge Workshop on Security Protocols by Mark Lomas 
(not yet published) on how the back-to-back use of two different and 
individually secure protocols can introduce weaknesses that were not 
to be found in either of the original protocols. 
Trusting in Computer Systems 44 
F 
in which commercial distributed systems are implemented. 
The TCB idea of placing all security related components inside a 
common boundary and then of verifying the "trustworthiness" of this 
construct does not seem to us to be particularly relevant to the design 
of open distributed systems; indeed it might well be considered to be 
the very antithesis of the open distributed concept. 
In a distributed system, it is very likely that different states of 
knowledge will exist in different parts of the system. There will be 
distinct designs, operators and users, and different assumptions will be 
made in the the use of protocols and (where it is used) cryptography. 
We observe that it is a specific characteristic of an open distributed 
system is that it will exhibit independent failure modes. Different 
parts of the system can fail in ways that not only are not related to 
each other, but are not necessarily detectable, for what they are, by 
other components. 
The appropriateness of applying a system designed for one context to a 
different context, without very careful analysis, must be open to 
serious objections. There can be large differences in the assumptions 
underlying the applicability and operation of the two systems; and this 
can introduce elements of risk, and also give rise to operational 
behaviour and failure modes, that are not properly understood by the 
system's implementers, operators and users, either collectively or 
individually. 
This is particularly so in the design of open distributed systems, where 
distributing what was originally a "closed" system operation can 
dramatically increase the complexity and risks involved. For example, 
replicating ·Trusted Computing Bases (TCBs), and linking them by 
networks (even ones that are encrypted) does not of necessity result in 
a system as secure as the original, closed TCB. 
This can result in an insecure system being constructed from 
individually secure components. An illustration of this was given at 
the 1994 Cambridge Workshop on Security Protocols by Mark Lomas 
(not yet published) on how the back-to-back use of two different and 
individually secure protocols can introduce weaknesses that were not 
to be found in either of the original protocols. 
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We believe that in much of the analysis of the security of distributed 
systems, the role of the medium - usually a communications network -
utilised for interconnection and the interchange of messages between 
component parts of the system has been largely ignored. The role of 
the network could be considered to be that of an active system 
component, or a set of such components; or as an intermediary ( trusted 
third party, even), or a set of intermediaries; or even some mixture of 
the two. 
We maintain that whichever consideration is taken, including that of 
ignoring the role of the network entirely, there will be major, and 
different, implications in the analysis of the trust relationships of those 
involved in the message interchanges in the system, and these will 
change between the various cases. 
In contrast to the "Orange Book" we believe that there is value in 
considering security issues, and trust in particular, from a local, 
subjective viewpoint rather than from an intrinsic and global system-
based viewpoint. 
The importance of considering a specific context and viewpoint to the 
understanding of trust can be illustrated by observing that two 
participants may trust an implementation of a system, but for different 
reasons, and because of these differences they will each have different 
vulnerabilities with respect to the system. 
What one participant has to trust the system for can be very different 
to that which another participant has to trust it for; for example, a 
service user compared to a service provider. As an example, let us 
consider the interaction between a bank and an account holder in a 
transaction involving the withdrawal of cash from an Automatic Teller 
Machine (ATM). 
The objectives from a customer's viewpoint could be stated to be that 
they do not get charged for the withdrawals of others, and that they do 
get the cash they ask for when they ask for it. 
The objectives from the bank's point of view can be stated as to ensure 
that it is not defrauded, and that wrong amounts of cash are not given 
out nor cash given to a wrong person. 
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We believe that it is therefore inappropriate to use one's trust 
assessment for the purposes of judging the other's level of risk - as 
bank customers who have been victims of "phantom" withdrawals from 
their bank accounts will have found out to their cost. 
The inappropriateness of considering trust to be a global property in 
c,listributed computer systems was nicely demonstrated in [CL95]. 
This paper concludes "In real life there is no global trust, and protocols 
should not be designed which unnecessarily require principals to trust 
their certification authorities." 
The above considerations lead us to conclude that there is merit in 
considering a different notion of trust to that used in the "Orange 
Book" and the various systems that seek to implement it. 
In the following section we propose a new way of looking at trust which 
we believe has considerable advantages over the "Orange Book" 
approach, particularly in the consideration of security issues in open 
distributed computer systems. 
Our approach allows for individual participants to assess their own 
level of risk. They are in a much stronger position to choose the level 
of risk that they are prepared to bear. 
We show how our approach can be used to examine the vulnerabilities 
of different participants in these systems, and how this can lead to a 
greater understanding of the risks that are being assumed. 
We also show how these concepts can be applied to sub-systems and 
component parts of distributed systems, and to stand-alone systems in 
a way that can allow for an understanding of individual failure modes. 
We do not believe that this can be done using the "Orange Book" model 
because the TCB concept of system-wide trust sidesteps the basic ideas 
required to conduct an analysis at the sub-system level. 
5.3 Trust and Knowledge 
"Truth" could be considered to be a constant and not subject to change, 
it is only how it is perceived - or perhaps we should say, how it is 
misperceived - that changes. To (mis)quote Shakespeare: "Truth is 
not truth that alters when it alteration finds": though there is a 
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dependency on the passage of time, since something may once have 
been true but have now ceased, or will in the future cease, so to be. 
We could say that almost the exact opposite might be said of trust. It 
can be argued that the more information that becomes available in a 
trusted environment, then the more the perception of the original trust 
~ould be expected to change21 • This would mean that the trust will be 
strengthened, confirmed, weakened or destroyed; but that almost 
certainly it will be changed in some way. 
As we have previously noted, trust is, by definition, not the same as 
certainty. It has been observed28 that trust is usually used in 
situations where "facts" are missing, but are needed in order to 
complete a process or procedure. Trust can be seen to change as 
knowledge of the situation changes. 
Our considerations lead us to the conclusion that trust is essentially an 
epistemic concept; that it relates to a state of knowledge and not to a 
state of a system [CH96]. We contrast this approach to the more 
traditional one found in the "Orange Book"29 • 
The concept of trust being "knowledge-based" rather than being 
"system defined" leads us to believe that it would be useful to consider 
the idea of trust being relative to a base of knowledge. 
To illustrate how this could be acceptable at an intuitive level, let us 
consider the following situation, using a general understanding of the 
meaning of trust. 
I have a financial officer of whom I have had personal knowledge for 
very many years. I have no doubts about his honesty. I am however 
aware that he has what is euphemistically called a "drinking problem"; 
and it is not unknown for the numbers coming from his department 
following a long lunch hour to need subsequent "updates". 
I am therefore be in a position where I do not necessarily question a 
person's honesty (i.e. I "trust" them, the person), yet I do not believe 
that the numbers I have been given by them are correct (i.e. I do not 
"trust" them, the numbers). 
27 Su la.ter discussion of trustworthiness. 
28 This was suggested during a private conversation with Professor RM Needham. 
29 This is also different from the concept of trust as extolkd by Francis Fukuyama in his recent book, "Trust» [F95]. 
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This example illustrates that to trust someone for one thing - e.g. not 
deliberately falsifying the accounts - is not the same as trusting them 
for something else, albeit related: in this case, delivering the correct 
accounts. 
We believe that it is important to our understanding of trust that 
:r,nany different things may be being trusted in any given circumstance -
in the above example these are honesty and competence, respectively. 
This leads us to consider trust in a different way to that usually 
presented in discussions of security of computer-based systems; where 
trust is considered to be a property of the system per se. 
Ai3 a consequence of our line of argument we believe that there is 
considerable merit in the consideration of trust as being a statement 
about relative30 , and local, knowledge; in contrast to the more usual 
usage of trust as an objective concept applied on a system-wide basis. 
When we examine how the concept of trust has traditionally been 
applied to computer-based systems, we see that it has not always been 
used in a common, or even a consistent manner. 
Probably the most widespread use of the concept of trust has been in 
the context of "Trusted Systems" (c.f. "Orange Book"). It has been 
stated that within the "Orange Book" context, a "trusted" component of 
a system is regarded as one that is capable of violating the security 
policy of that system. 
Trust . is thus perceived as a predetermined property relating to the 
system as such, and discussion of trust is therefore limited to a 
discussion of the security policy of the system, and the relationship of 
individual system components to that security policy. 
We believe it to be a significant shortcoming in the "Orange Book" that 
the secure operation of a compliant system is dependent upon the 
"correct input by administrative personnel of parameters related to 
security policy''; and where it is not stated what is the relationship of 
these personnel to the security policy itself, nor to how their actions 
affect whether a system is to be trusted or not. 
30 By relative here, we mean relative to a specific local knowledge base - however it may be stated, and whether explicit 
or only implied 
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What we have is a situation where system-defined criteria for the 
security of the system are administered by individuals who are neither 
included as components in the definition of the system, nor in the 
criteria for determining whether the system is to be trusted or not. 
We find this concept of trust to be of only limited utility in the analysis 
of the security vulnerabilities of open distributed computer systems. 
We contend that it is essential to an understanding of the security 
properties of a distributed system to include the administrators of the 
system as an essential part of the system itself. 
We would, in fact, go even further than this. We believe that it is 
essential to also include the designers, implementers and users of any 
computer-based system in the analysis of its security properties. 
We have already shown that there are a number of possible viewpoints 
from which to judge the security of a system, and we would ask what 
are the considerations that should determine which viewpoint should 
be used for the analysis of the system. 
It is not at all obvious to us why, of all the viewpoints that are 
available, the military criteria should choose that of the system itself 
for what is to be trusted and what is not. 
Such a consideration would seem to embody the view that it is only the 
behaviour of the (abstract) hardware and software components of a 
computer-based system that can in some way be made constant and 
therefore used as a basis for a (fixed) determination of trust. We do not 
believe that such a fixed focus is particularly useful in understanding 
the security weaknesses of commercial open distributed computer 
systems. 
In particular, we note that an abstract viewpoint, namely that of the 
system, has been chosen; rather than, say, that of the security policy 
formulator, or the policy's administrator. (We use the singular because 
it is our contention that if more than one administrator is involved, 
then the application of the security policy will differ between them 
because they will have different trust sets.) 
It is tempting to speculate that the choice of an abstract concept such 
as that of the computer system to form the base from which trust is to 
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be judged was made in the belief that it was possible to abstract the 
concept of trust, embody this concept in the system design, and then (figuratively) to put a wall around this embodiment. Such an approach 
would seem to imply that a man-made artifice, such as a computer 
system is to be trusted more than its specifiers, designers, 
implementers, operators, administrators. 
We observe that in many (non-military) situations where the concept of 
trust is used, it is most commonly used as a substitute for knowledge. 
As we have previously noted, trust is invoked instead of knowledge in 
situations where there is the need for a particular piece of knowledge 
to complete a transaction within the system, but for some reason this knowledge is lacking. 
We can obviously conceive of a number of possibilities why such 
essential knowledge might be lacking. These can include the difficulty 
and cost of obtaining the knowledge, the length of time it might take to 
obtain it, the availability of the knowledge, or even its very existence. 
We propose, therefore that trust be considered essentially as a 
statement about the position of one party in a system to other parties 
or system components. It is quite conceivable for different principals to 
have different views on the matter of the trust of the same aspect of 
their common system. 
It seems to us, therefore, that the "Orange Book" usage of the terms 
"trust" and "trusted" are better understood when associated with the 
related, but different, concepts of reliance and trustworthy. 
We do not believe the concept of trust as we have presented it, to be an 
atomic notion, to be treated as a discrete entity which either exists or 
does not. We show how it is possible to construct a notion of trust from 
a combination of statements of belief, that follows the intuitive use of 
the concept. 
We demonstrate this by introducing the following little 'calculus'31 we 
have formulated, and using it to examine the concepts of trust and 
reliance. 
31 With apologies and thanks to Burrows, Abadi and Needham [BANB9] , as appropriate. 
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It is our intention only take this discussion far enough to demonstrate 
our conjecture that trust is not an atomic notion, and also how it 
differs from other, similar, concepts such as reliance. 
5.4 A Simple Definition of Trust 
We start by presenting a working definition of trust, as it pertains to 
the principals of a system. In the following, A, B are principals, and S 
is a statement of some knowledge. This could be a cryptographic key 
or the state of a system, part of a system, or a system variable, for 
example. 
Defn: Trust 
A trusts B about S means 
If 
B saysS 
then 
A believes 
B believes S 
We write this as :- A t B 
We propose that this is different to a statement about belief involving 
principals, which we see as follows: 
Defn: Belief 
A believes B about S means 
If 
B saysS 
then 
A believesS 
We would like to emphasise that what we are concerned with here are 
statements that can be made about the principals in a system, and not 
with statements about knowledge or belief, per se. 
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We would like to demonstrate the use of this calculus by applying it to 
to an specific example32• Let us consider the earlier tale of the 
accountant and his boss. 
We start by noting that there are two different things that are stated 
as being trusted in this example: the person; and the person's output. 
'_L'hese could be characterised as the person's honesty and their 
competence, respectively. 
Let us try to formulate what we mean when we say that we "trust the 
person". This is usually taken to mean that we believe that they are 
not lying; that is, that they believe what they are saying: 
A trusts B 's Honesty: 
If 
B saysS 
then 
A believes 
B believes S. 
Which we note is our proposed definition of trust. 
In a similar way, a formulation of "trust of output" could be said to 
mean that we believe what they give us, that is: 
A trusts B 's Competence: 
If 
B saysS 
then 
A believesS 
Which is our definition of "belief'. 
We can see that what was called "trust" in the two cases can be shown 
to be two separate and distinct concepts. 
32 We are indebted to Bruce Christianson far suggesting this approach. 
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"Honesty'' is related to a state of mind, and it can therefore change; 
although the state of the system can remain unchanged. "Competence" 
occurs where it is believed that might be a fact involved. 
We believe that, without resorting to the realms of philosophy, a 
meaningful distinction can be made between different usages of the 
term "trust" and to what that term has been applied. These 
distinctions can be useful in the analysis of the security properties of a 
computer-based system as they can be used to illustrate different 
states of knowledge and perceptions of the principals in the system. 
Treatments of trust as a fixed property of a system, such as those 
contained in the "Orange Book", cannot allow such distinctions to be 
made. 
We believe that the simple concepts presented above are capable of 
being extended and developed further, however this has been left for 
further work. 
5.5 Further Considerations 
One of the ways in which this calculus can be extended is to consider to 
what extent deductions can be made from observations of the 
behaviour of principals using these and other, formalisms. 
As an example, let us consider our earlier definition of belief, but 
examine the behaviour from another viewpoint. Observations from 
this viewpoint could be presented as follows: 
If (it is observed that) 
B saysS (toA) 
and (A behaves in a way consistent with) 
A believes S 
then ( to what extent can we say that) 
A believes B (for S). 
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Further work will be undertaken to expand on this approach; again 
with the focus of different viewpoints and local knowledge. To the 
extent that belief is an internal state of a principal, then the question 
arises of to what degree it can ever be deduced from a principal's 
behaviour. 
It is our contention that an analysis of the security properties of a 
system, that ignores deceit; which will include bluffing, lying and 
misrepresentation, for example; will be unable to identify all of the 
major vulnerabilities of the system. 
The ability to handle deceit is central to the risks facing a computer-
based system, its users, and proprietors. It is this capability and 
perspective that is missing from the "Orange Book", and which we 
believe to be so important in our approach. 
In the case just given it is possible, for example, that A may know S by 
some other means than having just been told by B; A may have told B 
S, in some, other, unobserved, manner. Indeed, it could be possible 
that A and B are in collusion with each other to establish an alibi of 
some nature. 
Clearly, what can be deduced from observations alone may be very 
restricted and flawed. However, for many of the principals - and 
others with a stake in a system - subjective observation may be the 
only means available to them to examine the security characteristics of 
the system as these characteristics affect them. 
It is a major difference in our approach to those incorporating the 
"Orange Book" principles, that such a relativity of view is not only 
readily accommodated, but is at the very basis of considerations. 
We would reiterate that the calculus presented above is intended at 
this stage to be applied only to relationships between principals. It 
cannot be applied, as it stands, to relationships between principals and 
statements per se. 
By way of illustration we would point out that although it might look 
to some as if our definition of belief between principals could be 
considered to be transitive in nature, this could only be the case if 
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statements such as A believes S and A says S were equivalent. 
Clearly, such a proposition does not allow for the analysis and 
understanding of duplicity and misrepresentation by a principal. 
We therefore maintain that careful consideration is given to the 
distinctions already made concerning the application of these various 
concepts to "active" components of a system (e.g., principals), and 
"passive" components of a system such as cryptographic keys. 
It is just as obvious from our presentation of our concept of trust that 
as proposed, it is not transitive; and we believe that the precise nature 
of security attributes that are professed to exhibit the property of 
transitivity need very careful examination. 
Intuitively, notions of trust are usually concerned with actions, i.e., 
"behaviour'', and notions of belief are more normally associated with 
information, i.e., "facts". 
We believe that there has been some confusion between the concepts of 
trust and "reliance", just as there has been between the concepts of 
trust and belief. 
Reliance is not the same as trust. Something is relied on if it is 
necessary for the completion of an activity. Reliance can involve both 
"facts" (=belieO - the value of a particular piece of information may be 
necessary; and "behaviour" ( =trust) - the particular actions of a 
principal may be necessary. 
We note that the concept of reliance, although apparently composite, 
exhibits the property of transitivity. For if A relies on B for S and B 
relies on <C for S, then A relies on <C for S. This is true irrespective of 
whether A agrees to B's reliance on <C, or is even aware of it. It seems 
to us that this is the notion being considered when transitivity of trust 
is proposed. 
Other related terms are also to be found in the literature, such as 
"trustworthy", "authority'', "speaks for" and "jurisdiction", though not 
all of these terms are well-defined. 
The BAN logic does not use the concept of trust; instead it uses the 
concept of "jurisdiction", defined as follows: 
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Jurisdiction: 
if 
A believes B has jurisdiction over S 
then 
if 
A believes (B believes S) 
then 
A believes S . 
We observe that this definition contains a mixture of statements about 
"competence" (B has jurisdiction over S) and "honesty'' (B believes S ). 
It is still not clear to us the precise manner in which these different 
contexts are compounded. We would also note the similarity of the 
second clause (A believes (B believes S)) to our definition of trust. 
We would point out that the concept of jurisdiction as defined is not 
sufficient to replace the concept of trust as we have presented it, since 
of itself the concept of jurisdiction does not allow for the analysis of 
corrupt, malign, or incompetent, principals within a system. 
We observe again that many of the established methods of analysing 
the security properties of a system assume that the system has been 
installed, and is being operated, according to overall design principles 
that will require some level of internal system integrity. It will 
therefore be the case that any failure of the system to adhere to these 
integrity assumptions, for whatever reasons, are not capable of being 
detected within this framework. 
We would lik~ to return for one final reflection on the relationship of 
transitivity and trust. 
In a recent publication ([CB94], p. 54), Cheswick and Bellovin make 
the statement that "Transitive trust may also be an issue" when 
referring to a situation of interconnected computers independently 
extending their (so called) trust relationships unbeknown to other 
computers with which it is interconnected. 
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They present a situation where A trusts JB for something and 
unbeknown to A, JB trusts C for (part of)this. A is then said to be 
trusting C, withoutA's approval or knowledge. 
As we have covered above we believe that this is to confuse trust with 
other, and distinct, concepts: either reliance, or, perhaps in this case, 
delegation; depending upon the extent of specific knowledge and 
consent. There are clearly major issues regarding trust, and the 
evaluation of risk, in those situations where delegation occurs. 
There is an ostensible relationship between delegation and trust, and 
in many situations it is clear that we delegate to those we trust; but it 
is also clear that the converse is sometimes also true, and we "place 
trust" in something or somebody is a statement of effective delegation. 
What is not always so clear is the nature of what is being delegated. 
Sometimes it is the role (i.e., Departmental Manager), and sometimes 
it is the authority (i.e., approve invoices up to £xxx amount). 
We believe that the topic of delegation deserves a significant study in 
its own right, and in particular the relationship of the roles of the 
delegator and, for want of a better word, the delegate. The person 
doing the delegating and the person receiving the delegated powers 
will have different trust sets, that is they will trust different things in 
different ways. 
The situation surrounding delegation will be compounded where there 
is any form of delegation occurring that is not known to the (putative) 
delegator. Hidden delegation can present major problems and risks 
for the principals in a system; not the least of which is the 
determination of when it is occurring. 
We would point out at this stage that we believe there are implications 
of this research for ongoing research in other areas, for example we 
think that analogies can be made to the case of conventional computer 
systems and to the relative situations of system designer and system 
user, who could be said to have "delegated" the design of the system 
Our experience shows that the two parties rarely have identical sets of 
belief and trust. 
Trusting in Computer Systems 57 
1 ~ 
In a similar way a user running of a piece of · software could be 
considered to be delegating a task to the system when the programme 
is run. There a clearly many opportunities for hidden delegation to be 
occurring within the confines of an computer system and its system 
software. 
A similar argument can be made for the process of communicating data 
from one system to another, where the nature of the communications 
network can clearly add some complexity to the analysis of what is 
being trusted and by whom. 
Another topic that can be linked to the concepts of trust and delegation 
is that of"trusted third parties". We think that the discussions of trust 
and delegation above indicate the topic of trusted third parties as being 
a more complicated subject than is sometimes presented. 
We believe that the examination of what is involved in behaviour such 
as "trusting a key-server to deliver a unique and secure key'', using our 
approach, will point to many areas where the underlying assumptions 
have not previously been considered relevant to the security analysis. 
There are many situations where third parties are being used, and 
inevitably trusted, without the knowledge or conscious awareness of 
the user. We would argue that in many distributed systems the 
network itself is often viewed as "invisible", and we believe that it 
should be treated as a trusted third party in any security analysis. In 
general, we have not found this to be the case. 
5.6Summary 
We think tha~ our approach to trust as representing a statement of 
relative knowledge, compared to the more usual use of the concept as a 
property of a system, allows for the analysis of the security properties 
of participants and components within the systems boundaries. 
Our approach to associating risk with knowledge, rather than with the 
design of the system, allows us to handle in a consistent manner the 
actual operational characteristics of a system, and to allow for different 
principals having different perspectives of the system. 
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The "Orange Book" approach to the concept of trust imputes 
responsibilities to participants in the system that are necessary for the 
correct functioning of the system. In contrast it might be said that our 
approach could be likened to "every one for them self'. We believe that 
our view is particularly important for the analysis of corrupt, malign, 
or even incompetent, principals or servers, for example. 
Systematic comparisons of a number of different viewpoints can lead to 
a much better understanding of the system vulnerabilities, and can 
allow different principals to choose their own levels of trust in 
relationship to their knowledge base; and therefore to have some 
control over the levels of risk that they are prepared to tolerate. 
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"For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face. ~ I Corinthians ch.13, v. 11 
Chapter6 
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS, SHARED DATA 
AND DELEGATION 
6.0 Introduction 
Distributed systems combine potentially large numbers of independent 
components comprising hardware, software and communications into 
an apparently single operating unit. Services are provided by 
mechanisms whose internal workings are usually (deliberately) hidden 
from the end users of the system, by means of abstract interfaces, 
protocols and procedures. Indeed, it is commonly held that one of the 
key design objectives of a distributed system is to provide what is 
referred to as "transparency' 33 [ANSA89,IS092]. We shall see that the 
implementation of this concept can lead to serious and unforeseen 
consequences for users of the system at all levels. 
Transparency is a consequence - though by no means an inevitable 
consequence - of the separation34 of the component parts of a 
distributed system. Separation of components is an inherent attribute 
of a distributed system [CDK94], and it is this separation that provides 
for the parallel execution of programmes and for the multiple 
concurrent access to resources and data. 
It is the separation of components that allows a distributed system to 
be expanded and contracted as required - both physically and 
functionally - without disruption to the operation of the system as a 
whole. This is also often associated with the concept of "openness"35• 
While not being a prerequisite for a distributed system, openness 
allows for a more general sharing of resources in a way that can be 
33 Transparency is defined as the the "concealment from the user and the application programmer of the separation of 
components in a distributed system, so that the system is perceived as a whole rather than as a collection of independent 
components~ [CDK94] 
34 We will restrict our discussion here to physical separation, but the arguments can easily be extended to include logical 
and fanctional separation. 
3
s We use the term open here in the International Standards Organisations (ISO) reference model for Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) sense [ISOBl]. The term is also used in the sense of an open operating system[LS79] which deal 
mainly with the concept of minimal operating system fanctions (e.g. lightweight kernels), which are not specifically the 
subject of this dissertation. 
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independent of a particular operating system or specific computer 
hardware. 
The ISO Reference Model for Open Systems Interconnection [18081, 
IS092] has been developed as a standard conceptual framework for the 
definition of communication protocols that would meet the 
r~quirements of an open system; and it has become increasingly 
common for distributed systems to be designed specifically in an 
hierarchical and layered way that provides for both the logical and 
physical separation of functionality. 
A consequence of this design approach is that a number of common 
interfaces will occur at different levels within a system, from that of 
low-level physical and logical components to that of large-scale 
application programmes running on multiple (and often different) 
hardware platforms. 
These interfaces are provided to allow transparent access to specified 
levels of the system without the need to have knowledge of other parts 
of the system. We shall see that major, and unforeseen, consequences 
can result from the separation of the components of a system, and this 
can happen at many, if not all, of the levels within the system. 
A distributed system may include components (operating at the same 
or at different levels) that have been provided by, or are operated by, 
disparate organisational entities. These entities may be part of the 
user's organisation, but also they may be completely separate legally 
and organisationally. 
In either case, responsibility for the correct working of the system is 
likely to be split between different organisations, and this can lead to 
conflicts in th_e management and control of the overall system. 
The separation of the components of an open distributed system 
coupled with possibly different ownership, implementation, and control 
can lead to inconsistent results in operation, testing and fault-finding. 
Fragmentation of supply can also give rise to inconsistencies which can 
result from incomplete or inaccurate interfacing between disparately 
provided services. There is also the possibility of conflicting overlaps 
in the provision of services, with ensuing unpredictable of outcome. 
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The chances of this occurring with a small, well-managed in-house 
system, under single system management control, is likely to be quite 
small. However, within large-scale systems where functional and 
operational capabilities span many separate areas of management, 
geography and control, attempts to maintain consistency at one level of 
the system can conflict with parallel activities at other levels and by 
other, overlapping, functions. 
Some form of overall system management is needed in order to avoid 
these types of problem and to furnish a common set of user interfaces 
and services while at the same time maintaining consistency of the 
system's behaviour as seen by the user. 
The provision of facilities expected in distributed system such as fault 
tolerance and isolation, dynamic reconfiguration, component recovery 
and the enforcement of security and protection regimes will require the 
system management functions to have capabilities for the control of 
communications channels and for the selective isolation of users and 
components throughout the system. 
For system management controls to operate effectively, they will need 
autonomous communications capabilities that are separate to normal 
user service functions, and which can provide independent 
communications channels (both physical and logical) that are not 
accessible, or known, to other parts of the system. 
We can see how in an open system, the requirements for maintaining 
overall system integrity and fault tolerance can be used to justify an 
approach that hides the existence and detailed operation of sub-
systems and components from other sub-systems, components, end-
users, and even the systems managers of other operational domains. 
Unfortunately, the ability to subvert such a system, with its multiple 
levels and interfaces, is greatly enhanced by being able to hide what is 
going on within the system, thereby constraining the knowledge of 
users of what activities are occurring across the system. 
In the following sections of this chapter we look at the consequences of 
using a distributed system for resource sharing. We use the example 
of a commercially available system to illustrate the potential risks to 
users in systems of this type, and how the principles of transparency 
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and openness can undermine system integrity and lead to users being 
vulnerable to many forms of attack without their knowledge or ability 
to avoid. 
6.1 Distributed Systems and Shared Resources 
In a distributed system with a client-server architecture, a server is 
generally considered to be a component of the system that manages a 
particular type of resource [CDK94], be it a physical resource such as a 
printer, or a logical resource such as a file. A physical server may also 
sometimes have more than one logical function, such as being both a 
file server and a boot server. 
The concept of a resource is abstract and somewhat arbitrary but can 
be considered to be any object which can be allocated within the system 
[TB74]. Such objects can encompass a wide range of computer 
components including hardware items such as printers, processors and 
disc drives as well as software and system components such as 
programmes and processes, files and data bases, and mixed hardware 
(firmware)/ software functions such as system and remote booting. 
Services provided by such a distributed system must be able to 
reconcile the different requirements imposed by the need to operate 
with multiple clients "simultaneously''. There will be a requirement 
that there be a minimum of interference between the separate 
operations performed on behalf of different clients (or even multiple 
invocations from the same client), whilst at the same time being able to 
retain the necessary underlying ability to share the resource or data; 
and also to maintain overall integrity over the resource. 
With multiple clients accessing a common server, the possibilities of 
conflicts and inconsistencies are many. Different techniques have been 
devised in order to minimise or eliminate such conflicts as they occur 
with different types of resource. 
In the following discussion we will concentrate on techniques that are 
in widespread use for the avoidance of inconsistencies of data items 
shared by clients on a common server: though we note that these 
techniques do share many attributes with those used for other types of 
resource. 
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6.2 Shared Resources and Concurrency Control 
A server performs a series of operations on behalf of a number of 
clients, and does so in a manner that seeks to preserve the integrity of 
the data involved, whilst still allowing the maximum concurrency of 
access to data items consistent with this. 
The mechanisms most usually found in controlling concurrent access to 
data by different client operations involve the application of read and 
write locks to the data items. These locks can usually be applied at a 
number of different levels, from the highest logical and physical levels, 
to that of an individual record or field, depending on the type of 
application and data involved. 
The use of different levels (the granularity) of locking, can give rise to 
significant differences in the observed performance characteristics of a 
system, both at the individual server and also the client application; 
and the manner in which conflicting demands from client processes are 
balanced, can result in unequal treatment of different processes, with 
the possibility of certain users being advantaged or disadvantaged 
compared to others. 
The server will usually balance conflicting locking demands using a 
number of means directly available to it, such as suspending processes, 
queuing processes in one of a number of ways, or even by terminating 
them and requiring that they be restarted. 
The undetected manipulation of locking mechanisms in a distributed 
system is possible as a consequence of the implementation of the 
transparency design principle. Undetected tampering can also take 
place as a consequence of layering in open systems, where each layer 
represents a specified level of abstraction, and uses services provided 
by lower layers utilising this abstract interface (see for example [B93]). 
Hardware resources are seldom shared in the sense that several 
processes are simultaneously accessing the same device. Rather, the 
resource is said to be shared when exclusive control is given to each 
process for only a particular interval of time. 
The allocation of a resource in this way will clearly slow down the 
service for any given process, but it does allows the utilisation of the 
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resource to be that much greater than a totally dedicated resource. 
In order to allow this sharing of resource whilst at the same time 
meeting some overall system goals for performance, consistency and 
integrity there must be some form of overall system control of the 
resources involved. 
The synchronisation of concurrent access to shared resources in a 
client-server system is performed by processes that run on the servers. 
These processes control the management of locking schemes and 
mechanisms and are referred to collectively as lock management 
services. 
In the following section we look at a specific example of the 
implementation of a lock manager in an existing and well-documented 
distributed system. We examine some of the ramifications of this 
particular implementation, and the potential impact the design 
decisions can have on the operation and integrity of the system as a 
whole. 
6.3 A Distributed Lock Manager 
Digital Equipment Corporation's VAX.cluster"' environment 
incorporating the VMS operating system is regarded by many as an 
exemplary implementation of a distributed system. Its design 
objectives include, as well as the generic capabilities of a distributed 
system, the characteristic that members of a cluster can boot and fail 
in an manner which is independent of each other component of the 
system. 
This environment consists of a highly integrated organisation of 
computer systems whose members share resources, queues and disk 
storage under a single security and management domain. Although 
most cluster resources may be shared, user processes and system 
memory are node specific, and failures to the node will require the 
processes to be recreated by the user on possibly another node in the 
cluster. 
This description, and those following come from the VMS System 
Management Manuals [DEC88]. These documents are intended to 
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guide VMS systems managers through the processes and procedures 
necessary to set up and tailor a cluster operating environment. There 
are a number of software components used to implement the cluster 
functions, but we restrict our initial attention to the operation of the 
VMS Lock Management System Services. 
The Distributed Lock Manager provides facilities enabling the support 
of system wide synchronisation functions for control of access to shared 
resources. This is accomplished by the use of support services that 
implement the locking and unlocking of resource names, and the 
provision of queuing mechanisms. 
The resources controlled by the lock management system can be any 
entity recognised by the VMS operating system (for example, files, data 
structures, databases, and executable routines). We shall concentrate 
our discussions on data resources, and in particular file locking. 
The first point of note is that the lock manager is only effective 
between cooperating processes. The name that is specified by a process 
represents the resource that is being locked. "Other processes that 
need to access the resource must refer to it using the same name." 
It is stated in the VMS System Management Manual covering Lock 
Management Services that "The correlation between the name and the 
resource is a convention agreed upon by the cooperating processes". 
From this it would appear that the system is relying on agreements 
between user processes rather than on formal and enforceable policy 
regimes. If two processes were to refer to the same (or part of the 
same) data structure using different names, then the lock management 
processes are likely to be ineffective with regard to that data. 
No system-wide mechanism for enforcing names is presented, nor any 
system-wide facility for data management that might provide for or 
support the provision of unique names for data items. Even the use of 
the lock manager itself would appear to be entirely at the discretion 
of the user processes themselves. 
It is possible for individual System Managers to seek to enforce a set of 
standards and conventions when setting up processes for which they 
are directly responsible or over which they have some form of direct 
Trusting in Computer Systems 66 
control. It is unlikely however, that all accesses to shared data by 
processes within a distributed system can be foreseen, and 
enforcement of access controls to data will not be possible without the 
explicit and precise cooperation of all processes involved36• 
Even allowing for the goodwill and cooperation of the various users 
th~t share specific systems resources, it is still quite possible that 
different processes will have been established at different times and by 
possibly different parties, and that different models and assumptions 
will have been used which could result in the inadvertent bypassing of 
important system conventions and controls, and thereby affect shared 
data in ways that are both unknown and unanticipated by other users. 
The accidental and unplanned bypassing of systems conventions and 
controls is always a potential problem in systems that have more than 
one author and whose operations have been constructed and modified 
over a period of time. 
The lack of mandatory enforcement mechanisms is a serious omission, 
however, for the moment let us assume the case of a well ordered and 
centrally managed system, where we might feel fairly confident in the 
presumption that all processes are well-behaved and will always use 
agreed systems conventions and services. 
We might initially feel more confident that such an implementation 
could be considered secure against the problems associated with 
deliberate manipulation of the system to the benefit of one or other of 
the parties involved. With tampering unable to take place, or at least 
not in an undetected manner. 
In the next section we look at ways in which typical locking 
mechanisms37 are implemented. We shall see that not only are there 
opportunities for deception and manipulation of data at a number of 
levels within a distributed system; but tampering can take place in 
ways which can be concealed from users. 
Such tampering can be done in ways that are unverifiable by users, 
and even made to appear to have been done by parties other than the 
perpetrator, including users themselves. 
36 
"Many database administrators /mow that application security can be bypassed, but keep quit for an easy lift~ Neil 
Hutton [CS97]. 
37 A comprehensive account of file lockinK techniques can be found in [CDK94]. 
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6.4 Distributed Systems and Delegation 
One observation we can already make from what we have seen above is 
that significant portions of the operation of a distributed system lie 
quite specifically outside of the ability of a user to control, monitor or 
even verify. 
Of particular interest to us in these considerations is the integrity38 of 
the data within a distributed system. In practice, this data is held on 
behalf of a client by a server, and the only way usually open for the 
client to access and verify the data is to invoke one or more of the 
server's operations; operations over which the client has no direct 
control. 
The client has effectively handed over whatever independent 
capabilities it might have had regarding the data, and has, in essence, 
delegated its responsibilities to the server. 
It is therefore a consequence of using shared resources in a distributed 
system that control is being delegated, often unintentionally, and this 
will result in users and their applications having to rely on the servers 
within the system for the availability and integrity of those resources, 
whether they wish to or not. 
If we consider the implementation of locking mechanisms for shared 
data, as discussed earlier, then we might conclude that these processes 
will operate only in favour of the server. 
This should not be taken to imply that any ultimate benefit to be 
gained from the specific application of locking and queuing 
mechanisms will necessarily accrue to the server; but rather that the 
server is in a unique position to enable such benefit, however that may 
be measured. 
We can envisage situations (for example, in the areas of currency and 
securities trading) where the selective operation of locks could be used 
to disadvantage one user over another. There could be serious 
financial implications for a trader unable to access the current, real 
time, value of a share or currency exchange rate, or who is given as a 
current value one which has been subsequently updated. 
38 Integrity is used in the meaning that only authorised modifications can be made, and only by parties authorised to 
make them {P89}. The" is also the issue of the modifications being made correctly. 
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If, in addition to the user being given inaccurate or untimely data, the 
situation is deliberately hidden by the server and is unknown to the 
user, then the impact of any unfavourable effects could be greatly 
magnified. Even in those situations where a user is aware of 
something being wrong with the system, as could happen in the 
extreme case of denial of access, their ability to protect against possible 
adverse effects will be very limited. 
The above considerations lead us to ask the question: "On whose behalf 
does a server operate?". We have seen that it is not difficult for the 
selective use of read and write locks within a server to advantage or 
disadvantage different clients of that server. This could especially be 
the case when users are in direct competition with each other, while at 
the same time they are ("cooperatively'') sharing a common data base. 
This raises the issue of precisely how a client should treat a server. In 
looking back at our discussion of a trusted message server in Chapter 3 
we can see that there are a number of roles that could be considered: 
1. An extension39 of the client and its associated processes; 
2. An independent 40 executor of instructions. 
3. A hired41 third party. 
4. An agent 42 of a second party. 
5. An independent intermediary43• 
We have not specifically referred to the notion of a "trusted third 
party'' in our examples. This is because we do not find there to be an 
exclusive meaning to this concept. Examination of the above shows 
that they are all in effect "third parties", and they each will be 
"trusted" to some extent or another, depending on the way in which 
they are used. 
39 This is the easiest case to consider, since the objectives and controls of the server should be coincident with those of the 
client(s), and therefort verifiable as such. 
40 It is always important to ask of what or whom something is independent. In establishing independence we nu d to know who or what is defining or guarantl!eing such an attribute, and how it might be verified and monitomi. Is an 
independent entity to be considertd a part of the systl!m or to stand outside of it. Without complett! and unambiguous 
specification, any discretionary capabilities, whether exercised or not, will be unclear and unknown. 41 We have in mind here a facility that is specifically available to the user to undertake a given set of tasks or 
responsibilities directly for a specific user, and to an agru d performance level as a consequence of a commercial 
agrument between the two. In such an arrangement it is important that there is a clear understanding of what is being 
contracted for: the server or the service, what is individual and what is shartd, etc. Without this, a true understanding 
of what is beinx trusted and relied on cannot be obtained. 
42 An agent can be considered to be a rtpmentative of a party. It usually has responsibility for conducting negotiations 
and agrtements on behalf of its principal However, the exact nature of the legal rtlationship betwun the two is usually 
seertt, and therefore the prtcise relationship with an axent, and the capacity in which it is operatinx can be obscure. 
43 This is used to denote an entity that, unlike those above, has an equal relationship to both the user and server. 
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We have seen that the operation of a client-server relationship requires 
the client to delegate responsibilities, de facto, to the server. In order 
to understand more fully the implications of delegation, whether it has 
been implemented knowingly or otherwise, we feel that it is important 
to establish more detail about certain aspects of the relationship44 , for 
example: 
i) how a delegation relationship is established; 
ii) how long it is to last; 
iii) how operation of the relationship is monitored; 
iv) how the relationship is made known to others. 
As a deeper understanding is gained of the role delegation plays within 
a distributed system, more detailed abstractions that are more closely 
fitted to specific situations will be proposed. 
All we need say at this stage is that there is clearly a relationship 
between delegation and trust; and that in many situations delegation 
can be considered to be the "reverse" side of trust. 
As of writing we are considering the following working form for the 
representation of delegation: 
I [give/transfer/allow use of], [uniquely/irrevocably/until/unless/ 
·fora period/for a task], 
my [authority/power/knowledge] 
to [someone/something/( ones/things)] 
under [these conditions: ....... ] 
We believe that there is considerable scope for development of the 
concepts introduced above. Further work will yield additional research 
results, and ~ deeper understanding of the workings and failings of 
distributed systems designs. This work is, however, beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. 
44 For an example of how some authors have treated delegation refer to [GD90}. 
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6.5 Transparency and Trust 
As already noted, distributed systems are motivated by a requirement 
to share resources of one kind or another. Different operational and 
design models will be used for the various operations of these systems, 
such as communications, data storage and processing capabilities. 
Also, different trust models will apply to different parts of a system as 
viewed by other, dependent, parts of the system. 
We have seen that within a client-server system, the only way for a 
client to access data items stored on a server, is by invoking one of the 
server's operations. We note that, in general, a server will be 
operating on behalf of a number of client processes, each possibly 
unaware of the others' existence, and whose requests for service will 
probably be interleaved. 
To maximise concurrency, the server will have to serialise [P79, BG81] 
access to the data items, and will do this using its available 
mechanisms of resource locking and transaction queuing. It will even 
terminate process transactions in some instances, such as when 
deadlocks [H72] occur. 
It is clear that the server has primary control over the shared data, 
and is in a position to effect its contents at any one time, as well as 
being able to control the order in which operations are allowed to 
change the data. The manner in which a server has been configured, 
and many of the algorithms by which it operates will not be visible to 
users of the system. 
We have seen that transparency is used as a guiding principle in the 
design of distributed systems to provide a consistent and unified view 
of the system to its users. The implications of implementing this 
concept of transparency are quite far reaching, and from some 
viewpoints could be considered to have the potential for an extremely 
harmful influence on the design and behaviour of a distributed system. 
In the context of our discussions on servers we might conclude that the 
application of the principle of transparency is likely to result in 
mechanisms that hide how the system has been implemented, and the 
way in which it has been designed to work. 
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Hiding what a system actually does is probably the exact opposite of 
what a typical user would expect transparency to mean. It is much 
more likely that they will take it to denote complete visibility of what 
and how something is happening. 
It is understandable that an application programmer, wishing to 
concentrate on the functional details of an application, might welcome 
a common and "transparent" system interface with which to 
communicate. However, unforeseen consequences can result from lack 
of knowledge of how a system is configured and behaving at a given 
point in time. 
In many systems, especially those which are transaction based, 
applications, as well as data, will be shared. Ignorance of the details of 
a system's operations can have a major impact on the understanding of 
timing and performance issues of an application. 
Many assumptions will be made about the environment within which 
an application is presumed to operate. Some of these assumptions will 
be correct, others could be completely unwarranted, yet determination 
of which is which can be (made to be) very difficult. 
We have seen how the implementation of transparency can provide an 
environment whereby designers are able to conceal possibly hostile 
components and activities from users and applications. Such activities 
can include, for example: eavesdropping, replay of messages, 
impersonation of selected users and selective denial of service. 
These risks, which result from the decision to implement a distributed 
system in a transparent manner, are not always clearly understood by 
users and application programmers (amongst others). The perceived 
relationship to the system and its components can be quite different to 
the actual one, resulting in undeterminable effects particularly with 
regard to inconsistencies and failures in the operation of an 
application. 
Undetected manipulation of the system by legitimate members of the 
shared community can occur, in a manner similar to that described in 
Chapter 4. Unfortunately, as we have already seen, the ability to 
conceal the nature of such attacks is also an integral attribute of the 
implementation of the principle of transparency. 
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It is in such unforeseen ways that designs whose primary aim is to 
provide integrity at the level of the overall system can be in conflict 
with the integrity at the level of the individual user. Flexibility at the 
system level can override a user's requirements for independent and 
local reassurance, verification and validation. 
6.6Summary 
In previous chapters we have shown that by introducing a number of 
different conceptual viewpoints from which to view the operation of a 
system, we can highlight dependencies of one part of a system on other (possibly unknown) parts. 
The process of establishing what is actually known and what is being 
"taken on trust" from a particular viewpoint, allows for qualitative judgments to be made about the system that can represent an 
"individualisation" of risk as seen from that point. 
Application of the concept of transparency in the design of distributed 
systems, as discussed earlier, makes qualitative assessment of 
individual risk difficult to achieve. Only one viewpoint can be 
presented, apart from the "standard" user defined by the interfaces, 
namely that of the central system as assumed to be implemented. The 
correctness of this viewpoint cannot be checked, even post hoe, since 
this is exactly what transparency prevents45• 
We recall that transparency allows, or more correctly requires, the 
actual workings of the implementation of the system to be concealed 
from users, and we can conclude that transparency is not the same as 
integrity or accountability. 
In summary, given the way in which distributed systems are designed, 
we conclude that in the presence of transparency: 
1. There is no defence against insider attack: 
the system may be corrupt and the user cannot prove it; 
the user cannot differentiate between accident and malice. 
45 
"It is desirable that the global infrastructure and other higher level infrastructures (the supporting physical and logical environment layers of a syskm) should conceal the details of transparency mechanisms from objects operating within the service environment layers~ From the ANSA reference manual [ANSA87]. 
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2. The converse is also true: 
the basic system can be innocent of bad behaviour, but a user 
may be corrupt and the system cannot prove its own innocence. 
3. Logging and audit rely on locking services that can be subverted 
and therefore cannot be used as a reliable record of events, no 
matter how good the locking service specification. 
4. The use of replication relies on the correct implementation of 
even more complicated protocols (such as Byzantine agreement 
[LSP82]), and therefore cannot be verified either. 
We have seen when analysing different operational possibilities in the 
comparatively simple case of the message server discussed in Chapter 
5, that the complexity of situations and outcomes can escalate very 
quickly. Our conclusions establish the necessity for analysing specific 
distributed system implementations from various viewpoints, with 
representative combinations of systems components, users, designers, 
public interest, etc. This is, however, beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
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"Never ascribe to malice that which can adequately be explained by stupidity~ Unknown 
Chapter7 
Conclusions 
7 .O Synopsis 
The thesis of this dissertation is that there is no such thing as a 
computer system. Or to be more specific, we find that we are unable to 
agree with the concept of "a computer system" as being something 
monolithic that can be represented by a single conceptual model, which 
is internally and externally consistent, and which behaves as a whole 
in a uniform and predictable way, under all foreseen circumstances. 
There may be little disagreement with a statement such as this put in 
this way, yet we find in practice that it is just such a view which is 
usually applied. The assumption that a system is a single entity about 
which global statements can be made (such as "the system is secure or 
" the system works") is unfortunately all too common. 
The treatment of a collection of (usually) co-operating entities as a 
single, uniform and consistent whole is misleading. It is to imply that 
there is, or can be, a single valid point of observation from which all 
activity can be seen to be deterministic. 
Different components of a system - which should be taken to include 
designers, users, programmers and system managers, as well as 
clients, servers, operating systems, applications programmes, software 
and hardware sub-systems and networks will all need to be considered. 
They will all have different views of what they perceive to be the 
system and its associated behaviour. In a very real sense, the 
behaviour of a system will be relative to the viewpoint of a particular 
component at a particular time. 
We need to be able to reason about large systems, and not just about 
their components. For this we would like to have conceptual tools that 
will help us to understand the behaviour of these systems, and to help 
us make sense of other, possibly conflicting, views. 
Trusting in Computer Systems 76 
I I 
I 
We have sought to indicate the need for a new methodology that will 
allow us to better identify and understand those areas of possible 
conflict or lack of knowledge, and we have looked for ways to improve 
the design of computer-based systems in a practical manner that can 
be readily understood and applied. 
We propose that anyone planning the design of a system, or part of a 
system, should look at it from the point of view of each of the 
participants, and that this should include all of the components -
including users and implementers - to see what they are relying on and 
to make sure that these assumptions are compatible. 
We believe that a more detailed characterisation of the various 
participants in a computer system, and of their roles and underlying 
assumptions, will lead us to a better understanding and identification 
of those areas where these assumptions rely on undefined capabilities, 
or are at odds with one other or are capable of being understood (and 
therefore implemented) in more than one way. 
To this end we have introduced the concept of "trust", and defined it in 
a way that enables qualitative judgments to be made. The additional 
concepts of "reliance" and "delegation" are introduced, and highlight 
the dependency of one part of a system on other parts of the system, 
including those that are unknown and possibly even unknowable. 
We conclude that trust is best considered as a localised concept used as 
a substitute for knowledge, and that considering a computer system to 
be a discrete entity with global characteristics can be dangerous and 
damaging to the "health" of computer operations and their users. 
7.1 Summary 
The principal goal of our work has been to identify new systems 
engineering approaches that can help in the design and construction 
of computer systems that more closely reflect the expectations of users. 
In particular, we have examined ways in which the design of computer 
systems could be improved by a systematic approach to the 
identification and reconciliation of the many assumptions that are held 
by the different parties with a stake in the system. 
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Experience leaves us with the abiding impression that the goals, 
objectives, concepts and assumptions of the various parties who are 
involved in a computer system (i.e., systems designer, programmer, 
operator and user) are seldom, if ever, coincident46• 
We frequently hear today, criticism of many computer-based systems 
that the needs of users in particular are inadequately realised, or even 
ignored. Many aspects of computer systems such as reliability, 
availability, functionality - sometimes too much, as well as too little -
and ease of use have been under attack by both users and operators; 
and also by members of the public who, although not necessarily 
directly involved with the system can often be seriously affected by its 
operation [CWC]. 
We have sought to identify and examine ways in which the design and 
engineering of distributed computer systems can be improved, 
particularly with regard to their users. The predictability of operating 
characteristics from the point of view of a user has been a particular 
concern. 
We have looked at ways in which users of a system can survive system 
faults . Significant effort has gone into the design of "fault tolerant" 
systems (see for example, [C91], [CDK94], [M93] and [A97]), but 
exactly what is being tolerated, and by whom or what, is not always 
apparent. 
We would like to be able to understand the behaviour of large systems 
in totality and not just their components, and we have sought to 
establish a conceptual framework for reasoning about the integrity of 
computer systems and their component parts. We have used this 
conceptualisation to gain insight into the nature of possible computer 
systems failure modes and to examine ways for systems to survive 
certain classes of failures. 
We do not believe, however, that there is a unique point from which it 
is universally valid to judge the adequacy of a system. Whilst it is 
probably most common to find that the system itself has been . used as just such a point (c.f.H80), the behaviour and security of a system 
depends upon the point of view from which it is being judged. 
46 John Shores artick "Why I never met a programmer I could trust» [S88 J highlights many of the issues in a thought-provoking, somewhat amusing, way. 
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We have looked at ways to identify and evaluate risks from specific 
and different perspectives rather than from that of an abstract and 
idealised concept of a system as a whole. We have been looking for 
ways to change our view of what is happening from that of the system 
"looking out" to that of the user " looking in". 
We have sought to analyse why the actual ways in which systems 
behave differ from users' expectations: i.e. why users are surprised 
when and how the system they are using fails for other than a 
straightforward hardware breakdown; and have examined the role 
that trust plays in users' expectations. 
We have shown that what can be deduced from observation of the 
behaviour of a system depends upon the the point of view of the 
observer; and we have developed a concept of viewpoints that assists in 
the understanding of expectations of different participants. We have 
shown that the implementation of large systems will almost inevitably 
result in conflicts between different viewpoints. 
Attempts to conceal the workings of a system from users - such as 
transparency and layering - do not allow for the development of 
different viewpoints. The diversity of the different participants is 
effectively collapsed into the single position of an idealised system as 
conceived by the designers. 
To give focus to our investigations, we began by considering the 
security aspects of a distributed system and its components. In the 
context of a distributed computer system, security is not just about 
protection from invasive elements or the divulging of secrets: it is at 
least as much about correctness of operation and consistency of 
observed behaviour. 
We have found that a lack of clear and agreed definitions of many 
security concepts has hindered coherent and consistent discourse of 
many aspects of system failure. We have introduced some new 
concepts in an attempt to clarify some of the important issues. 
Traditionally, security of computer systems has been based on 
considerations that have originated in military models of thinking [e.g. 
BL73]. This model is primarily concerned with secrecy of information 
and the prevention of unauthorised disclosure. 
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This is clearly, in itself, not sufficient to maintain the security of a 
system, and a counterpart model dealing with the integrity of 
information was subsequently proposed by Biba [B77]. Together these 
two models have provided the basis of the U.S. Department of Defense 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation standard [DOD85]; also known 
as the "Orange Book" because of the colour of its covers. 
The principles underlying the "Orange Book" have been widely used in 
the design of many commercial systems where security is considered to 
be an issue. However, military models of security with their 
predominant emphasis on secrecy and access controls, are not always 
the most suitable basis for the design of an open distributed 
commercial system. 
Attempts have been made to separate the issues involved between 
military and commercial requirements, and an example of this can be 
found in [CW87], where Clark and Wilson set out to present a security 
policy for data integrity that was based on commercial data processing 
practices. 
In a commercial environment we observe that integrity, 
reproducibility, verifiability and availability of information are 
frequently more important considerations than the major concerns of 
secrecy and access control found in military settings. 
In particular, we note that concentration on secrecy could result in an 
environment where concealment of behaviour that threatens the 
security of the system is quite easy to accomplish. It can be argued 
that in many circumstances, openness and verifiability result in 
systems that are intrinsically more secure against many of the typical 
threats to be found within commercial environments. 
The "Orange Book" sets out to deal with "remote-access, resource-
sharing computer systems". However, in comparison to commercial 
systems, military systems are most likely to be closed systems rather 
than open in their implementation. The model relies upon there being 
a security boundary around the system. with a clear differentiation 
between what is inside and therefore trusted, and what outside and 
therefore not trusted47• 
47 Wt' havt' previously noted the Canadian effort to extend security criteria to a wider range of products [CSSC93]. 
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One of the fundamental motivating factors behind the concept of open 
distributed computing systems is the desire to share common resources 
between different users. It is inevitable that different users will have 
different requirements and priorities, and it is therefore unavoidable 
that at the outset of the design of such systems there will be a conflict 
of interests. 
When we consider the design of commercial open distributed computer 
systems, we are considering systems whose commonality lies in their 
starting point of some standard or definition of the system to be 
produced. It seems inevitable that different designers and 
implementers will produce systems that will sometimes behave 
differently in similar circumstances as a result of their individual 
interpretations of a system's specifications 48• 
Systems which are designed, implemented and operated by separate 
organisations, are unlikely to have a common and unique boundary, 
with a simple "inside" and "outside". It is therefore understandable 
that the primary source of threat to such systems can arise from the 
activities of a participant who is in some respect an "insider". 
The "enemy within", a participant of the system with knowledge of how 
it works, and where absence of uniform and consistent interpretation 
and control has resulted in weaknesses in the overall security of the 
system, will be in a strong position to threaten it. 
In addition, absence of common control structures can result in failures 
of independent, component parts of the system going unrecognised or 
being misinterpreted by other parts of the system. Although this is not 
the same class of threat as the putative "enemy within", the rogue 
activities of such "insiders" can have effects on the system that are 
arguably of even more serious consequence. 
We have already noted that systems designed in one context can be 
implemented in another. Whenever this is done, careful evaluation of 
an appropriate threat model is necessary to ensure that the design 
assumptions of the system being implemented match those. of the 
system to which they are being applied. 
48 The task involved is not to be unde~stimated. Bell et all [BBD77] reported that the requirements document for a ballistic missile defence system contained over 8000 distinct requirements and was 2500 pages long. 
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We have also seen the importance of ensuring that all of the 
assumptions underlying the design of a system are clearly documented. 
Without this the implementers are unlikely to realise that such 
assumptions have been made; which can result in unpredictable 
behaviour of the system that is difficult to trace and analyse. 
The appropriateness of applying a system designed for one context to a 
different context, without very careful analysis, must be open to 
serious questioning. There can be large differences in the assumptions 
underlying the applicability and operation of the two systems. This 
can introduce unforeseen elements of risk and give rise to operational 
behaviour and failure modes that are not properly understood by the 
system's designers, implementers, operators and users, collectively or 
individually49• 
This can be particularly the case in the design of distributed systems, 
where incorporating what was originally a "closed" system into an open 
and distributed operation can dramatically increase the complexity of 
the system and the associated risks. For example, replicating trusted 
computing bases (TCBs), and linking them by networks (even ones that 
are encrypted) is likely to result in a system that is less secure than 
the original (see Figure 1)5°. 
When we look at Figure 1 we note that in the open system 
implementation of this model that the TCB has dual roles, sometimes 
acting as a TCB and sometimes acting as a user. Indeed, we can see 
from this diagram that it could be acting in both roles simultaneously. 
We can also see that a TCB could be acting in one role towards one 
TCB, and in an entirely different role towards another. 
We note that the concept of a Trusted Path is an essential component 
of the "Orange Book" trusted system. The interconnections between 
replicated TCB's in an open system version of a trusted system will not 
be Trusted Path's as understood in the "Orange Book" context, and the 
integrity of the originally conceived secure system will already have 
been compromised. 
'
9 Sommerville notes in his book [S89] that "It is very difficult to formulate a definitive specification for large software systems. Thus, it should be assumed that initial system requirements will be both incomplete and inconsistent "" How much more so, then, will this be the case in an open distributed system. 50 In this example the secure operation of the trusted system depends upon the link between the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and the User being a Trusted Path (TCP). A trusted Path is defined in the "Orange Book" as "A mechanism by which a person at a terminal can communicate directly with the Trusted Computing Base and cannot be imitated by untrusted software ~ 
Trusting in Computer Systems 82 
I 1 1 
"ORANGE BOOK" 
I 
,I 
Trusted System 
General Open Distributed System 
Figure 1. 
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We have deliberately not complicated this diagram by trying to 
represent the "real" users of such a distributed system. 
To help us to focus our discussion we propose the following definitions: 
A distributed system consists of a collection of processors, together 
with their ancillary peripherals, systems and applications 
software, connected by a communications network51 • 
An open distributed system is one where the interconnection 
between the different levels and components of the system is 
achieved through implementations that are not necessarily 
identical, but which are designed to a common set of specified 
interfaces. 
Let us consider, as an example, the complexity of the security problems 
that might be involved in an open distributed computer systems 
concerned with the management of the storage and retrieval of multi-
media data. Where text documents, images, video sequences, maps 
and other complex objects are stored in independent databases, that 
may be physically separated, and which are interconnected by a 
network of communications links. 
In a typical open distributed system such as this, it is very likely that 
different states of knowledge will exist in different parts of the system. 
There will be distinct designs, operators and users, and different 
assumptions will be made in the the use of protocols and (where it is 
used) cryptography. 
It is not at all clear to us that a direct analogy can be made in cases 
such as these to the more simple model presented in the "Orange 
Book". Going ev~n further, we would maintain that representing 
complex systems such as these by the simple replication of the "Orange 
Book" model will only mislead in any analysis of the systems security 
properties. 
We have separately demonstrated · that the proper operation of 
cryptographic protocols depends upon their context and environment. 
The use of a protocol outside of its specified (or implicitly specified) 
environment can lead to unanticipated and undesirable behaviour. 
51 In some discussions the network is inc/udd as part of the distributed system. 
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Some protocols are specific about the environment in which they are 
designed or presumed to operate (for example, Needham-Shroeder's 
trusted principals), and these assumptions are explicitly stated. 
Attacks on these protocols often are successful because the protocols 
have been implemented in in an environment that in some way 
violates or differs from that presumed by the designers of the protocol. 
It is sometimes obvious what some of the designers' assumptions are: 
some are made quite explicit, while others have been made implicitly 
obvious, for example, by reference to another protocol they are seeking 
to improve. However, there frequently are others that are not stated, 
or even acknowledged, and in these cases the discovery of various 
attacks on the protocols illustrates the constraints, (and also some of 
the hidden assumptions) that need to be considered if the protocol is to 
be successfully implemented. 
We have also shown that the outcome of a particular protocol 
(successful or not) will usually depend upon information or criteria 
that are not part of the protocol itself. 
This raises the issue of how far it is desirable to go, outside of the 
specific description of the message interchange itself, in order to 
ensure that the protocol can terminate in a known outcome or state. It 
seems to us that many protocols appear to be designed on the basis 
that they always work; and that if something adverse happens - a 
wrong key, wrong message or reply, for example - then the protocol 
may just terminate in some indeterminate state. It is not clear to us 
that this is a reasonable approach to take. 
All of which can result in an insecure system being constructed from 
individually secure components. An illustration of this was given at 
the 1994 Cambridge Workshop on Security Protocols by Mark Lomas 
(not yet published) on how the back-to-back use of two different and 
individually secure protocols can introduce weaknesses that were not 
to be found in either of the original protocol. 
We should point out that we are not here seeking to introduce the 
notion of composability, and its application to the security properties of 
a system - for a discussion of this topic and some of the issues involved, 
we refer you to the session on Composition at 8th. IEEE Computer 
Security Foundations Workshop [CSFW8]. 
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Our deliberations could be seen as being orthogonal to those being 
worked on in the area of Composition, where attention is more 
focussed on issues of properties that may be invariant between 
systems. We are concerned with considerations of a subjective nature: 
it is a consequence of our line of argument that there is considerable 
merit in looking at trust as being associated with relative, and local, 
knowledge; in contrast to the more usual usage of trust as an objective 
concept applied on a global basis. 
Clearly the considerations of the two approaches are related, but what 
we seek to illustrate here are the local consequences of using a system 
component, considered to be secure in one environment, but which is 
not secure when implemented in another, different, environment. 
We observe that a specific characteristic of an open distributed system 
is that it will exhibit independent failure modes52 • Different parts of 
the system can fail in ways that not only are not related to each other, 
but are not necessarily detectable, for what they are, by other 
components. 
The importance of context and viewpoint to the understanding of trust 
can be illustrated by observing that two participants may trust an 
implementation of a system, but for different reasons, and because of 
these differences they will each have different vulnerabilities with 
respect to the system. 
What participant A has to trust the system for can be very different to 
that which participant B has to trust it for; for example, a service user 
compared to a service provider. It is therefore inappropriate to use 
one's trust assessment for the purposes of judging the other's level of 
risk - as bank customers who have been victims of "phantom" 
withdrawals from their bank accounts will have found out to their cost. 
This can be considered another example of where from one viewpoint it 
is the system that is trusted but not the user, and from the other 
viewpoint it is the user who is trusted but not the system. Other 
viewpoints exist where, for example, neither is trusted. 
52 We are also aware that the occu"mce of"common mode »failures in complex systems can also cause unpredictable 
failures that are difficult to isolate [C97]. 
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Military systems attempt to define security boundaries where those 
components that are inside are considered "trusted" and those outside 
the boundary are not to be considered "trusted". Using the "Orange 
Book" concept of trust something is trusted if it can violate the security 
policy of the system; that is, if it exists within the security boundary of 
the system. We have noted that in the commercial environment, it is 
much-more likely that a threat to the security of the system will come 
from within rather than from outside. 
In the "Orange Book", trust is treated essentially as an intrinsic, 
system-based concept. It is also implicit in its usage that there is just 
one viewpoint from which trust, and the security of a system, is to be 
judged. We have shown that this usage has somewhat limited utility 
when applied to commercial open distributed systems. 
In contrast to the standard use of trust as a property of a system, our 
notion of trust applies only within the context of a specific viewpoint 
from which to judge risks. We argue that it is only after the 
introduction of a specific context from which trust is to be judged, that 
we can understand many of the intrinsic vulnerabilities of a system. 
We have introduced a concept of trust that is directly related to 
individual participants in the system and to their lack of knowledge 
about it. In this regard, then, we propose that trust is therefore not to 
be treated as a property of the system at all, but as an attribute of 
individual participants. We have shown how this approach can be 
used to identify and measure the risks associated with the system for 
any particular participant. 
We have proposed that we consider trust to be related to what we have 
not directly verified and therefore what we do not know. Our 
understanding of trust is as a measure of the current limitations of our 
knowledge. Trust can thus be seen as a substitute for knowledge. 
When this has not been explicitly realised, then this can lead to things 
being trusted that perhaps should not be so treated. Also we note that 
within our considerations, trust is not to be seen as a constant, but 
something that can change as knowledge changes. 
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We have introduced the concept of there being more than one 
viewpoint from which to describe the behaviour of a system, and 
therefore the trust relationships that pertain. The utility of this 
concept lies in its ability to enable the nature of the risks associated 
with a specific participant to be measured, whether these are explicitly 
recognised and accepted by them, or not. 
All systems are of necessity, trusted in some way. We propose that our 
goal should be not to have to trust a system; we argue that we should 
attempt to systematically replace trust with knowledge in those areas 
that are of a critical nature to us. Our goal should be that we should 
try to reach the position where "we know (or can verify that) it works" 
replaces "we trust it". 
In those situations where we are consciously aware of trusting 
something, we should endeavour to identify mechanisms that will 
validate its behaviour. 
The extent to which we will be able to pursue this goal, and the 
associated costs of this approach, will vary with the anticipated costs of 
failure in the system. The level of trust we are prepared to assume is 
thus directly related to the level of risk that we are prepared to accept, 
using our notion of trust. 
Our approach is not restricted to particular participants - for example, 
system and user - but can be extended to any component, module and 
sub-system that has well-defined interfaces. This allows trust models 
for individual parts of the system to be considered, along with those of 
the suppliers and users of the system. 
This enables us to analyse a system from a number of different 
perspectives, and therefore to build a more complete understanding of 
the nature of the assumptions - many of which may never have been 
explicitly stated, recognised, or even understood - which underlie its 
design and operational behaviour. Different assumptions result from 
different levels of trust. If trust models are not identical then different 
risks will be being assumed53• 
53 As software engjnem, wt: tend to negkct motkls. In other scientific disciplines, motkls act to unify and explain, 
placing apparently disjoint events in a larger, more untkrstandabk .framework. The lack of motkls in software 
engjnt:ering is symptomatic of a much larger probkm: a lack of systems focus. Few software engjnt:ers untkrstand the 
need to tkfine a system boundary or explain how one system interacts with another [PJCK97]. 
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Our treatment of trust as being associated with specific viewpoints, to 
be seen as not a system-wide property but rather as an attribute of a 
participant in a system (whether this be user, operator, designer or 
even a sub-system or component part), and which can differ for 
different participants and also at different times for the same 
participant, enables us to examine, for example, the vulnerabilities of 
one part of a system to failures in another part. This could be then be 
extended to the detection of suspicious behaviour of either a system 
component or system user. 
We believe our analysis to have shown the limitations of applying even 
relatively simple security models outside of a well-understood and pre-
defined environment; and the risks that can occur in applying them 
outside of the context in which they were designed. 
This has led us to propose a method for codifying and comparing the 
risks inherent in any computer-based system, and how this can enable 
the level of risk at any particular level in the system to be understood 
and managed at that level. 
We have shown that it is insufficient to take the viewpoint of just one 
of the involved parties as the basis for defining a system's behaviour, 
and to judge the system from only that particular viewpoint ( the one 
usually taken being that of the designers of the system). It is essential 
to any comprehensive understanding of the system that the separate 
roles of the implementer and the user are also included; with the 
assumptions about the system from their viewpoints being 
documented and taken fully into account in any analysis of the 
system's behaviour. These assumptions can then be examined, and 
verified, in detail, and compared for ambiguities and conflicts. 
We think that. far too many assumptions are made that are implicit, 
and understood by only one of the parties. Examples of this are: "I 
expect the ATM to give me my money, and not to give it to anyone 
else"; "I expect the system not to give out money in a way that would 
make the bank liable to lose money"; "I expect the compiler to compile 
my code accurately and efficiently, and not to add any code of its own" 
(c.f. Ken Thompson's Turing Award Lecture [T84]). 
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Each role, and each participant in that role, can be expected to have 
assumptions about the operation and behaviour of the system from 
their own viewpoint. Our experience has shown that these sets of 
assumptions are unlikely to coincide, and are more likely to conflict in 
major ways in many areas of critical importance to the participants. 
We argue that each party should understand what it is that it relies on 
from other parties and parts of the · system, and that its "trust set" 
should be explicitly stated and compared with that of the other 
relevant participants at whatever particular level the analysis is being 
undertaken. 
We maintain that not only will this highlight the "hidden" assumptions 
of one party on other parts of the system, but it also enables the 
identification of those areas where the assumptions do not match, or 
where there are major conflicts. We believe that it is only from a study 
of the behaviour of each of the relevant parties that a thorough 
understanding can be attained of what each party may be implicitly 
assuming. 
We believe that the adoption of our approach will allow for the 
identification of the extent and type of assumptions that each 
component in the system is making and relying on for the correct 
operation of the system from its viewpoint, and for the detection of 
incompatible and conflicting goals. 
We are proposing that trust be considered as a relative concept, and 
that it is not the result of knowledge but a substitute for it, and that 
adopting our viewpoint is fruitful for the analysis of security risks in 
computer-based systems. 
We hope that our approach will give a new meaning to the words 
"trusting the computer" - and will result in fewer examples of the 
inappropriate application of a design from one context being applied to 
a different and unsuited context. We would like to see computer 
systems "trusted" less and "known" more. 
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7.2 Future Work 
Our investigations have pointed to some exciting areas of future 
research. We believe that the further development of conceptual 
models based upon our ideas can lead to better understanding of the 
reasons why computer systems fail in the way that they do54 • This can 
lead to improvements in the design of distributed systems that will 
allow the viewpoints of the users and operators of these systems to 
assume a more prominent place in the design considerations. 
The concepts of trust, reliance and delegation are capable of further 
development and applicability. The development of a rigorous method 
by which the behaviour of a computer system can be evaluated from 
different perspectives and at different levels within the system, as well 
as from without, will provide a powerful tool for systems engineers in 
the future. 
The application of the ideas we have developed to specific computer-
based services such as trusted and untrusted third parties, electronic 
notary services and even networks themselves could lead to greater 
understanding of the local component of computer operations This in 
turn can help us to understand the relationship of the computer 
system to the environment in which it is required to operate. 
We would like to see the tying together of the computer system itself, 
the operational environment and the policies by which the system 
including the users are to conform. 
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Appendix I 
Trust 
From the Pocket Oxford Dictionary: 
"trust. 1. n . Firm belief that a person or thing may be relied upon, 
state of being relied upon." 
"take on trust: accept as true &c without testing'' 
"in a position of trust: having duties that can be neglected without 
immediate detection" 
From ISO 9594-8:1993: 
"trust: Generally, an entity can be said to 'trust' a second entity 
when it (the first entity) makes the assumption that the second 
entity will behave exactly as the first entity expects. This trust 
may apply only for some specific function. The key role of trust in 
the authentication framework is to describe the relationship 
between an authenticating entity and a certification authority; an 
authenticating entity shall be certain that it can trust the 
certification authority to create only valid and reliable certificates." 
From CD 10181-1.2: 
"trust: a relationship between two elements, a set of activities 
and a security policy in which element x trusts element y if and 
only if x has confidence that y will behave in a well defined way 
(with respect to the activities) that does not violate the given 
security policy." 
"A security sub domain element can be told by a security super 
domain security authority to trust elements of other security 
domains." 
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"Trust is based on assurance which can be obtained either by 
something elements of security domains are told or by something 
they know." 
From section 26.24, part I of the ODP Reference Model: 
"Trust is a relationship between agents where agent A delegates 
agent B to carry out certain roles under rules determined by A and 
agreed by B." 
From the Orange Book: 
"Trusted Computing System: A system that employs sufficient 
hardware and software integrity measures to allow its use for 
processing simultaneously a range of sensitive or classified 
information" 
"Trusted Computing Base: The totality of protection mechanisms 
within a computer system - including hardware, firmware and 
software - the combination of which is responsible for enforcing a 
security policy." 
From the ITSEC: 
The term "trust" is conspicuous by its absence in the ITSEC. 
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GLOSSARY 
We briefly define some of the terms that are used in this dissertation. 
Authenticate. "1. To invest (a thing) with authority; to render 
authoritative." [OED71] 
Authority. "4. Power to influence the conduct and actions of 
others; personal or practical influence." ibid. 
Confidence. "6. The confiding of private or secret matters to 
another." ibid. 
Confidential. "4. Enjoying the confidence of another person; 
entrusted with secrets; charged with secret service." ibid. 
Confidentiality. "Confidential quality; state of being 
confidential." ibid. 
Covert Channels. A programme that transmits information 
about itself, the data it operates on or other aspects of the 
computer system to unauthorised individuals. 
Cryptography. The writing of things in a secret or disguised 
manner. This is usually done in order to hide data from 
unauthorised view. It is also used in the provision of'digital 
signatures' and message authentication. 
Denial of Service. The prevention oflegitimate access to a 
computer system. 
DES. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was developed for the 
government of the USA for use by the general public for sensitive 
information. It is based on an algorithm developed by IBM known 
as Lucifer and now more properly as DEA (Data Encryption 
Algorithm). It uses a combination of substitutions and 
permutations applied for a repeated number of cycles, usually 16, 
to encrypt plaintext using a 64-bit key into 64-bit blocks. 
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1: 
Digital Signature. The digital analogue(!) of a written signature. 
Integrity. "2. The condition of not being marred or violated; 
unimpaired or uncorrupted condition; original perfect state; 
soundness." ibid. 
NQn-repudiation. The attribute that enables a message to be 
proved to have originated from the sender it purports to come from. 
Privacy. The property of preventing the unauthorised extraction 
of data. 
Public Key System. A cryptographic system which relies on a 
separate key for encipherment and decipherment respectively: one 
of which is publicly disclosed; the other of which is held secret by 
the user. 
RSA. RSA encryption is named after its three inventors: Rivest, 
Shamir and Adelman. It is a public key algorithm which uses 
two keys, one for encryption, the other for decryption, that work in 
symmetric pairs. It is based on the difficulty of factoring the 
product of two large prime numbers. 
Secrecy. "1. The quality of being secret or of not revealing secrets; 
the action, practice or habit of keeping things secret.." [OED71]. 
Secret. "A adj. L Kept from knowledge or observation; hidden, 
concealed. a. Predicatively (esp. in to keep secret): Kept from 
public knowledge, or from the knowledge of persons specified; not 
allowed to be known, or only by selected persons." ibid. 
Security. It is perhaps interesting to note that the the term 
secure originally had a different meaning that that in common use 
today. The origin of the word is from the Latin and means 
'without care'. The Oxford English Dictionary [OED71] notes the 
original usage and meaning: 
"A adj. 
I. Feeling no care or apprehension. 
1. Without care, careless; free from care apprehension or 
anxiety, or alarm; over-confident. 
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In early instances often contrasted with safe. 
1641 QUARLES Enchir, iv. lxiii, (1654) T 1, .... The way to be safe 
is never to bee secure." 
The current meaning is: 
"II. Having or affording ground for confidence; safe; (objectively) 
certain." ibid. 
It is perhaps ironic that many of todays systems are probably 
secure in this original sense rather that the more modem 
meaning. 
Symmetric Key System. One in which the participants share a 
secret key known only to themselves Also known as a shared-key 
or private key. 
Trap Door. A concealed entry-point to software in a computer 
system. 
Trojan Horse. Software that does one thing (usually destructive) 
while appearing to do another. 
Virus. A segment of self-replicating code that attaches itself to 
application programmes or to other executable system components. 
These code segments move from programme to programme and 
machine to machine. They can replicate an indefinite number of 
times. [MH89]. 
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